

Report
on the Seminar

Peace-building and Development

Specialisation Course

Zebra Country Lodge / Republic of South Africa
July 1 – July 6, 2002

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
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Specialisation Course -
Peace Building And Development
1 July '02 - 6 July '02

Table of Contents

Table of Contents	1
Acronyms	2
Foreword	4
1. Introduction	5
1.1 Conceptual Framework for Peace building and Development.....	5
1.2 Development and Conflict	7
1.3 Conclusions	8
2. Peace Building and Development	9
2.1 Conceptual Introduction	9
2.2 Structural Stability.....	13
3. New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)	18
4. Development, Aid and Peace	21
4.1 Economic Framework of Development, Aid and Peace	21
4.2 Five Strategies for the Millennium.....	31
5. Privatising Peace	45
5.1 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)	45
5.2 Violence, Force and Conflict - Nature, Causes and Consequences	46
6. Peace-building and Conflict-Sensitive Development	50
6.1 Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development	50
6.2 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)	51
7. Network of African Peace Builders (NAPS)	56
7.1 NAPS Report.....	56
7.2 SWOT Analysis.....	59
<i>Annex I: Program Outline</i>	63
<i>Annex II: List of Lecturers</i>	67
<i>Annex III: List of Participants</i>	70
<i>Annex IV: Evaluation Report</i>	75

Acronyms

ASPR	Austrian Study Peace Centre for Conflict Resolution
AU	African Union
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CNN	Cable News Network
CSVR	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
DDR	Demobilisation, Disarmament and Disintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOWAS	Economical Commission for West African States
EPU	European Peace University
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross Net Product
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LDC	Least Developing Countries
MARP	Millennium African Recovery Plan
MEF	Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation
MSP	Multi Stakeholders Processes
NAI	New African Initiative
NAPS	Network for African Peace Builders

NEPAD	New Partnership for African Development
NGOs	Non-Governmental Organisations
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODF	Official Development Finance
OECD	Organisation of European Commission for Development
PCF	Post Conflict Fund
PIU	Project implementing Unit
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SACCORD	Southern Africa Centre for Conflict Resolution and Disputes
SACPN	Southern Africa Conflict Prevention Network
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
TA	Technical Assistance
TF	Trust Funds
UN	United Nations
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
WB	World Bank

Foreword
by
Rinos Simbulo
NAPS Co-ordinator

Peace is one vice that has been elusive for mankind from time immemorial. The world has invested billions of dollars in search of peace but with no signs of success. After the Second World War, the birth of United Nations provided some hope for human race in the attainment of peace. However, this has never been achieved with violence and loss of life being the order of the day around the globe. The latest terrorist attack on America and the retaliation by the allies on Afghanistan is one example that makes realisation of global peace look gloomy.

It is maybe time that new social world order of peace building be explored using basic structures involving local initiatives as a way to achieve peace. The hope for sustainable peace can only be attained if investment of peace begins to be organised by local structures and systems that clearly understand the nature of conflicts, which ultimately end up into violence and war situations.

Information flow and networking are but some of the important tools that needs to be checked during peace building. Africa cannot afford to continue to watch millions of its citizens being maimed everyday with no tangible/practical approach in ending the scourge. It is important also to recognise the fact that the new social world order of peace building would not achieve anything if the inequalities and imbalances of the share of natural resources continue to exist, and in certain cases widening. The social equity is critical in the attainment of sustainable peace. The local structures and systems at community levels will only respond to peace building if the huge disparities of the haves and have-nots begin to be narrowed.

The huge investment in weapons of mass destruction will not bring peace to the globe. Millions of our children are exposed to horrific scenes not only in the movies but also through real violent scenes through the media. It is my humble view that the use of relevant information and establishment of structures (peace networks) which will bring different stakeholders with such initiatives of peace building through conflict prevention should be recognised and appreciated by all. This initiative should move us away from armed peace keepers to non-uniformed citizens. These global citizens should fully get involved in peace building structures as the ones that Austrian Study Peace Centre for Conflict Resolution (ASPR) and its partners the Network for African Peace Builders (NAPS) and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) is working on. It is therefore imperative that inter-governmental organisations like the African Union (AU), European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) system should begin to offload some of its resources to initiatives like this one.

The world will never be at peace as long as part of it continues to experience violence. The dream for the world should be a future that is peaceful with diminishing poverty where the global citizens would enjoy personal security. The building blocks of the future prosperity should be in the quest for a peaceful world.

1. Introduction

by

Susanne Nebel

Director, Africa Program, ASPR

The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR) has been active in Peace-building training, awareness creation and networking in Africa since 1996. Peace-building seminars were conducted for middle level Governmental representatives and the civil society aiming at a policy related discourse combined with a training workshop on conflict transformation. The seminars are being offered to a wide range of professionals: diplomats and diplomatic advisors, policy planners, high level NGO representatives, middle level military and police officers, University professors and lecturers, community representatives and other individuals. Through the multi-actor approach of the seminar, it is ensured that peace-building is understood as a process with long term objectives that includes all sectors of the society, aiming at structural stability, thereby fostering sustainable development. Specialisation courses are being offered to the members of the Network of African Peace-builders (Naps) to enhance and deepen their Peace-building knowledge in special fields, such as DDR, sustainable development, Human Rights, election observation etc. The programme is funded by the Austrian Development Co-operation Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The first such specialisation course was designed to meet the special needs for African peace-builders in the area of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR). The course took place in Mozambique, a country deeply involved in demobilisation and reintegration measures following the Rome Peace Accord in 1992.

The second specialisation course reflected the specific need for in-depth knowledge and information exchange on Peace-building and Development, following the launch of the New Partnership for African Development (Nepad) and the inauguration of the new African Union, with one of their primary goals of Peace and Security.

This Working Paper reflects the results of a joint training endeavour of the ASPR with partner organisations such as the Network of African Peace-builders (Naps) and the Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), which took place in the Republic of South Africa from July 1 to July 6, 2002.

1.1 Conceptual Framework for Peace building and Development

The political framework

The overall aim of peace building, to transform conflicts constructively and to create a sustainable peace environment requires efforts at many levels and must be built over a long period of time. Building peace is an organic process, growing at all levels of society. Peace enhancing structures are essential for sustainable peace. Structural stability at the political level, the justice level, the social and the economic level is a necessary pre-requirement for the overall goal of sustainable peace in a country. Furthermore, besides the absence of physical violence, the elimination of

unacceptable political, economic and cultural forms of discrimination, a high level of internal and external support or legitimacy (participatory democracy), self-sustainability and viable structures and social and environmental conditions with the capacity to manage change without resorting to violent conflict

The economic framework

Poverty is the prime enemy of peace and security in today's world. There is evidence, that poverty, unjust resources distribution and violent conflicts in a country go hand in hand. Most violent conflicts occur in countries with poor economic development. The costs of wars are immense and can throw back a countries development efforts by years or even decades. If poverty is to be addressed, we must focus on the interrelation between political, economic, environmental and social development. Poverty is not just a lack of material resources. It is also to lack rights, education and influence.

The debate around the impact of development assistance and conflict has also led to the fundamental questioning of aid systems and the impact of global economic processes in the face of these powerful forces, development has not reduced inequality or delivered broad based growth and this is leading to further consideration of the links between globalisation, development and conflict.

The key to future development is to change the nature of the relationship with our partners in the so called developed and developing countries. Partnership should be based on a foundation of shared values and mutual trust.

Donors - An international partnership

Donors can make an important contribution to promoting co-existence and peace-building efforts by providing financial support which enables individuals or groups from different ethnic, racial or religious background to participate in shared projects. Without funding it is likely that these activities would be significantly jeopardised.

Donors such as the World Bank have made pledges of aid for post conflict recovery. During the 1990s the international donor community pledged more than US \$ 100 billion in aid to three dozen of countries recovering from violent conflict. Providing a bridge between emergency humanitarian relief and long-term development, these financial and material resources in the form of loans, grants, debt forgiveness and technical assistance, are designed to persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflicts peacefully and are intended to lay the foundation for a sustainable transition in economic growth and participatory governance.

Privatising Peace

The corporate sector is facing an unprecedented challenge today. Driven by international competition to expand into new markets and develop untapped resources, it is increasingly finding itself moving into countries where violence and chronic instability are the norm. Simultaneously, it is operating in a commercial environment in which consumers are demanding more and more accountability and social responsibility in the way companies pursue their operations.

The example of the Republic of South Africa has shown that the business community has played and is still playing an important role in the South African transition from violence to peace and from apartheid to democracy.

Also dictated by the need to secure markets against a backdrop of fierce competition, extracting companies have struck alliances with private military companies to pacify violent enclaves and continue resource exploitation. This development has raised several moral dilemmas and brought to the fore the issues of accountability, social responsibility and transparency.

1.2 Development and Conflict

There is a growing understanding in recent years of the links between conflict, peace and external assistance and on the role which development assistance can play in both ameliorating and exacerbating the root causes of violent conflict. This new awareness has highlighted the need to explore how development co-operation and other forms of external assistance can contribute to conflict prevention. Thus, both at the policy planning and institutional level a number of donors, NGOs and academic institutions have begun to incorporate conflict prevention objectives into their assistance programmes. For development and humanitarian agencies, as well as NGOs, greater attention is given to conflict sensitive programming, monitoring and management. This is in response to the need for more effective programmes with demonstrable positive impact as well as to the pressure for programmes which minimise the negative consequences of humanitarian assistance. Emergency aid and development efforts can contribute to the exacerbation of conflict and inequality. The Great Lakes, Liberia and Kosovo conflicts all provided valuable lessons. A co-ordinated and coherent response is needed which explicitly addresses root causes of conflict (e.g. social injustice and inequity) and take account of the dynamics of accelerating and triggering factors.

Conflict Sensitive Development Co-operation

Development assistance programmes can have the potential to increase tensions and exacerbate violent conflict. Inadequately planned or inappropriately targeted programmes can marginalise vulnerable groups, overlook underlying root causes of poverty and contribute to the risks of violent conflicts. Consequently many donors are attempting to change their approach in favour of policy frameworks that emphasise structural stability under which support for good governance, human rights and representative civil society is enhanced.

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)

The aim of PCIA are to assess the positive or negative impact of different kinds of interventions (or the lack of thereof) on the dynamics of a conflict; to contribute to the development of a more coherent conflict prevention and peace building policy; and to serve as a sensitising tool for policy-shapers and policy-makers, helping them to identify weaknesses in their approach.

PCIA is a planning and management tool that can assist development and humanitarian organisations in analysing situations of potential conflict and identifying strategic opportunities for conflict prevention and peace building. It can also be adopted for monitoring the impact of

these activities. The PCIA is based on good development practice and related approaches to conflict analysis such as Early Warning.

1.3 Conclusions

Against this background, it is hoped that the course has contributed to raise the awareness on the interrelatedness of Peace-building efforts and sustainable development in Africa and has empowered the participants by closing the information gap around Nepad, enabling participants to enter the constructive and critical discourse around Nepad. We are sure that the course contributed to encouragement and hope, exploring new ways and partnerships for uplifting the African continent into prosperity and peace.

The database on experts trained in specific fields of Peace-building can be found in due course in the homepage of the Network of African Peace-builders (Naps) www.naps.org.zm

The database shall provide easy access to trained experts to be deployed for national and international missions in conflict prone areas or violent conflict zones in Africa.

2. Peace Building and Development

by

Christopher Landsberg

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2.1 Conceptual Introduction

Peace is not merely the absence of war. It is also a culture of tolerance and social justice, for without these there can be no sustainable peace. In a fundamental and universal sense, therefore, peace is an ideal to continually aspire to. Conflicts are, however, inevitable and can even be healthy so long as they do not become violent, unmanageable or destructive of productive energies and resources. The capacity of a society, or community to turn conflicts away from degenerating into violence is an essential condition for social justice and peace. Such capacity is multidimensional and not immutable. In other words, the factors that make for democratic and effective management of conflicts encompass the economic, political, social and cultural; and these factors can be changed, improved or worsened.

The historical experience of conflicts and peace efforts also provide at least three further conceptual and practical insights. First, even the most ``protracted and unmanageable conflicts`` do get resolved through human agency. There are tested and creative strategies for addressing most conflicts and for building peace. Second, the termination of devastating conflicts can present unique opportunities for rebuilding societies and communities on new democratic foundations. Conflicts, in this paradoxical sense, can end in renewed hope and actions to secure peace and social justice on firmer ground, if the appropriate lessons are learned and applied. Third, it is more efficient and humane to prevent violent conflicts and to sustain peace through social justice than to focus on managing and resolving conflicts.

The African Context

Peace and conflicts present a lot of challenges in Africa. Historically, violent conflicts in Africa date back to pre-colonial times marked by inter-ethnic conflicts, wars of conquest and slave raids. The colonial period saw intensified wars of European conquest throughout the continent and national wars of liberation starting with the Algerian war of Independence in the 1950s and ending in the 1980s with the national liberation wars in Southern Africa. It is noteworthy that these wars were often prolonged and complicated through the involvement of cold war super powers.

The post-colonial period on the other hand is marked by civil wars that start within nation -states and spill beyond borders to engulf neighbouring countries such as the long-standing wars in Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Algeria and Uganda.

Currently, more than 20 African countries are mired in violent conflicts, with attendant gross human rights violations, horrific levels of human suffering and collapsed economies. The statistics are astounding: Seven wars have each taken between 500,000 and 100,000 lives

(Angola, Sudan, Mozambique, Rwanda, Somalia and Uganda). In the Great Lakes Region alone, 5 million lives have been lost in the past ten years. With approximately 10 percent of the world's population, Africa has nearly a quarter of the world's refugee population (second only to the middle East). Thirty of Africa's 53 countries have experienced significant economic decline as measured by Gross National Product (GNP) as a result of armed conflicts. And nearly 25 percent of African children have been negatively affected by armed conflicts (killed, orphaned, permanently maimed, become child soldiers or suffered serious psychological trauma).

The underlying causes and dynamics of violent conflicts in Africa are generally not fully understood. In addition, efforts to analyse and manage violent conflicts are not adequately supported. African institutions that can effectively and democratically address the challenges of conflicts and peace are few and weak, making the continent largely reliant on international organisations and foreign powers for leadership in resolving conflicts -with all the dangers and inadequacies such reliance implies.

There are, however, some significant African responses to this challenge. Inter-governmental mechanisms such as the defence and security organs of the Economic Commission of West African States (ECOWAS), the IGAD, and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) show some promise. There is also a large number of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that conduct advocacy and offer some important lessons.

Mr Landsberg stated that any discussion of peace building should start with a definition of peace itself. Peace is tranquillity and it is the relative absence of violence. Peace is often defined as the absence of violence and the absence of the use of force. But a deeper meaning of peace is also social peace. It is, therefore, not only about the absence of violence but the provision of basic needs. Therefore, there can be no peace if the socio-economic needs of the people are not met.

In his 1992 Agenda for Peace, the former United Nations (UN) Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Ghali defined peace building as the construction of a new environment. Proactive peace building is the investment of peace in credible and legitimate institutional framework to avoid future breakdown of peaceful conditions.

Countries emerging out of conflict pose serious challenges for post conflict peace building. We should remember that armed conflicts destroy economic infrastructure and create massive unemployment. Countries in conflict tend to have a distorted structure of public spending, with heavy portions diverted to militarisation. This clearly limits the ability of governments to spend on desperately needed reconstruction. Thirdly, countries emerging out of conflict, face severe constraints associated with weak state institutions and lack of effective mechanisms to deal with conflict and popular participation. Fourthly, countries are characterised by high levels of social tension, which pre-date conflicts.

A successful Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme is a key component of an effective transition from civil war to sustained peace, but implementing this is very difficult.

Demobilisation is the process of turning soldiers into civilians. It applies to regular and irregular

soldiers. The process starts with identifying soldiers to be demobilised and ends with the discharge of soldiers from military service.

Disarmament includes taking weapons away from soldiers; give up personal weapons and associated ammunition and equipment. Weapons and equipment may be destroyed or reallocated according to the peace deals.

Reintegration refers to the process by which former combatants and their families become assimilated into social, economic and political life in civilian communities. The objective of reintegration is to permit ex-combatants and their families to become productive, self-sustaining members of the community. It is a complex psychological, social, political and economic phenomenon.

Peace building and peace keeping may be successful if it prevents or ends conflict, but genuine peace can only be effective if it helps to build a durable, just peace. Peace building includes not only addressing the root causes of the conflict, but also rebuilding the ability of the state to sustain itself politically, socially and economically. The Africans need always to be involved in the peace keeping, peace building, and post conflict reconstruction efforts.

Reconciliation as part of peace building efforts should not be limited to the national level, but should be expanded to include reconciliation at the individual level. In Rwanda and South Africa, reconciliation was restricted to the national levels only, and that is why peace in such countries is still very fragile, because people need counselling and psychological healing at the individual level.

Therefore, we have to draw a distinction between peace building and sustainable peace building. Peace building can be conceived as the underlying process by which individuals, organisations, institutions and societies develop the abilities individually and collectively to overcome conflict, accomplish certain tasks and functions and set and achieve objectives. Sustainable post conflict peace building should be locally focussed involving peoples and communities. It requires a society - based approach and building consensus around national goals and priorities, and enhancing national fundamental lessons of post-conflict peace building. The process needs to be approached slowly and incrementally. In post conflict countries, the governments must have adequate capacity to plan, implement and oversee reconstruction and development.

While discussing the conceptual framework of peace building, Mr Landsberg emphasised the importance of drawing a distinction between formal and substantive peace. Formal peace is at the level of formal political settlement among the conflicting parties and might end with a formal peace treaty and or a new constitution. Substantive peace refers to activities and processes among country groups that involve issues of restorative justice, social justice, reconciliation, counselling and other activities that will consolidate peace from the bottom- up rather than a formal agreement. Formal peace is whenever the belligerent parties are engaged into peace negotiations and a peace agreement is finally signed. This is at the elite level. He argues that without substantive peace at the grassroots level and without involving the issues of social justice you cannot have sustainable peace. Peace therefore should not be seen as merely the end of war. And the African challenge demands a double (formal peace and substantive peace) understanding of

peace. How do you, after the end of war, gain tolerance, social justice and sustainable development, without which you cannot have sustainable peace? Formal peace is important before peace consolidation. The challenge is how do we consolidate peace after the formal peace has been signed?

It is also important to distinguish between peacemaking and the actual operationalisation or implementation of formal peace followed by meaningful consolidation of peace, which refers to substantive peace. Conflicts are healthy so long as they do not become violent, destructive or unmanageable. The capacity of the societies to manage conflicts into positive out-comes presents a difficult challenge to African countries. Any attempt to terminate a devastating conflict must be turned into opportunities to rebuild our societies, where the peace building process should respect the human agency rather than structures of the society. The poor people who are always the unorganised majority and the Community Based Organisations (CBOs) are neglected and yet these grass root/bottom people are more effective when it comes to cultivating sustainable peace through social justice.

While using Zimbabwe as an example, Mr Landsberg said that the circulating conflict in Zimbabwe is a crucial one. He reiterated that whatever the views on democracy and good governance in Zimbabwe at present, the land reform process/property rights issue remains a fundamental/substantive question and if not properly handled and resolved, it will continue to influence negatively on sustainable peace in Zimbabwe despite the formal peace achieved in 1980. It was emphasised that although we should not move away from the formal peace making, but we should use a peace building approach that includes the local grass root communities.

Democratisation and good governance are key elements in a post conflict reconstruction because democracy and good governance in Africa are one way of managing conflicts. Democracy and good governance determine how we manage our resources because in Africa many conflicts are resource based. The peace building processes should integrate sub-national, national, regional and international efforts at all levels in a complementary and integrative approach, since they are all inter linked. The governments at the national and provincial levels often neglect the community people who should be the starting point in peace building, hence a need to establish a link between the community and national, and other levels of peace building.

Mr Landsberg identified the need to develop the capacity of African Union (AU)/Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to deal with conflict resolution in Africa through the spirit of Pan-Africanism. The champions of the move to transform the OAU into AU like President Muammar Gaddafi, President Thabo Mbeki and President Olusegun Obasanjo have been criticised that they want to govern Africa but he quickly added that the debate has now shifted from who should govern Africa to a more crucial question of how should Africa be governed? Further he said the present transformation of OAU into AU is a positive move because unlike the original line of non interference in internal affairs of the sovereign member countries by OAU, the present AU has singled out among other principles that the AU can now intervene in internal affairs of sovereign member countries if, first, there exists serious violations of human rights, potential for genocide in any country, if instability in one country can lead to instability in the neighbouring states and if there is unconstitutional change of governments. He said that the AU, therefore, has come up with new norms and values, which will enhance the capacity of AU to intervene and resolve African

conflicts.

We cannot, therefore, underestimate the new norms and values in the AU. The challenge for Africans is how do these norms and values become shared and how do we translate them into practice? The nature of the state is very crucial in post conflict reconstruction since the state makes policy and turns that policy into practical deliverables.

Last year, the SADC countries passed a protocol on politics, defence and security co-operation. SADC also has a protocol on democracy and good governance.

2.2 Structural Stability

One way of altering structural stability is by creating IECs. From the perspective of structural stability, it is important that we do not underestimate the importance of the rules of the game in elections. There is a need for a level playing field to assure all competing parties that they have equal chances of competing for power. The rules of the game are established at the formal level.

The very process of making the rules of the game should be inclusive. In Africa, the government reserves the process exclusively to itself without including the opposition actors. If these rules are established through an inclusive, agreeable way, they can constitute one way of cultivating confidence in post conflict peace building processes. As Africans we need to draw from each other's electoral process. There is a need also to rethink the "winner take all" model during elections. In order for the IECs to play their role in the respective African countries, they need to do work well in advance before elections. The mandate of the IECs should also go beyond conducting elections to include conflict management training, to enable them to handle conflicts between conflicting parties and individuals during elections. The IECs should also continuously monitor political and democratic processes in a proactive approach, to avoid potential conflicts over politics and democracy in their respective countries.

The political parties have a crucial role to play in the democratic development processes. The outside funders for such political parties also have a role to play in influencing an equitable competition. It is also important to make sure that there is "no one size fit all" democracy model for the whole of Africa. The civil society must also play a crucial role during the electoral process through participating in voter and civic education. We should also know that we cannot have completely free and fair elections. However the actual vote counting process remains crucial in the voting process. The independent media can also mitigate and instigate conflicts, and should report accurately and positively.

From the point of view of peace building, inclusiveness, consensus building and rules of the game are very crucial. It is important to note in order to create genuine Independent Electoral Commissions (IECs), all political parties need to be represented, but should not be composed of only supporters of government who appoints, funds and mandates the electoral commissions in Africa.

Sustainable development can be defined in two ways:

One way is to define it as all efforts that pursue development policies and strategies, that become

self reliant on Africans through empowering them to achieve development goals.

The second way, but which has been largely neglected, is looking at the relationship between the environment and development. This approach to sustainable development seeks to devise ways through which we can alleviate poverty without depleting the environmental resources, so that future generations do not suffer from the present development activities. The environmental dimension to sustainable development is hence very important. We need to know that this is an interdependent world where we are all vulnerable and hence affected by activities of others.

The environmental degradation has led to changes in climate and hence the food crisis in Southern Africa. The depletion of the ozone layer leads to climatic changes through depletion of resources that future generations will depend on for survival. Environmental degradation has taken place through deforestation and pollution of the air and water resources. In the African context, fresh water is for instance a basic scarce need and one predictable future conflict within the SADC region. The SADC members are already dependent on neighbours for water. The water resources therefore deserve a place on the agenda of peace building in the SADC region.

Economic Dimension

The role of the state in conflict prevention and post conflict peace building has changed within the present global context. The government role has been now restricted to simply creating an enabling environment in which the private sector will play a role. The government is hence less involved as a social actor. Yet the private sector cannot take care of health, educational and food security.

The World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) prescriptions through the structural adjustment program have also not led to equitable growth. Although their policies have led to economic growth in some cases, such growth has been short lived and has increased the inequality between the rich and the poor which has impacted negatively on positive peace, due to lack of equality and economic development. Even with economic growth in Botswana, the growth failed to address the human centred development in areas of health, education and food security. The policies introduced from the top have not led to economic development from below and policies like privatisation led to unemployment.

There is still a fundamental gap between the promise and reality from the West. Even the trade and market structures are fundamentally skewed in favour of the West. Hence the African countries are asking for market access. The agricultural subsidies extended to the farmers in the northern countries are larger than the GDP of Africa as a continent, yet the north, through IMF and World Bank is directing all African economies to stop subsidies in all sectors including agriculture.

Structural Stability and Social Justice (Group Work)

In Africa, the causes of conflicts are multidimensional, and they include external and indigenous causes which are political, economic, social exclusion, poor governance, abuse of human rights, manipulation of ethnicity, culture of impunity. Since the causes of conflicts are multidimensional, the post conflict reconstruction should be multidimensional if a meaningful peace building

process is to be achieved.

The society in Africa relies on individuals to respond to the society problems, which constitute a structural weakness. One-way of dealing with such structural weaknesses in Africa is through empowering the civil society. But, how do we empower the people? The civil society should not be restricted to the NGOs who interact with the governing elites and hence neglecting the grass root ordinary people. Although the civil society institutions should be empowered, the people should themselves be empowered to articulate the needs of the society and to hold government accountable.

In Africa, we are all living in divided societies, hence the need to prescribe the rules of the game so as to regulate activities. The rule of law must always be respected by the government of the day if we are to strengthen the social and political structures.

One way of setting the rules of the game is through constitutional democracy. But how do parties compete? How do we renew leadership in a situation where one thinks that he/she is doing a favour to the society by staying in power? The rules of the game for competition must hence be well spelt out and respected. The periodic democratic renewal of leadership is important and levelling playing fields for competition in our societies is important. It is also important to eradicate corruption because it affects negatively the distribution of scarce resources in the society and it often consolidates the elites in the society.

It is one thing to have a constitution protecting human rights and another thing to implement the same constitution. Although Africa has legal instruments, the challenge is how to translate these instruments into reality.

During elections, it is important to emphasise impartiality, credibility, transparency and fairness. There is a need for constant surveillance, checks and balances, transparency and accountability at all levels of government. But in practice, this remains elusive in Africa.

Therefore, peace building requires a creation of these institutions but also strengthening the internal capacity of these institutions. We need to standardise and harmonise laws and implement them, make policies, and create institutions in order to enhance capacity.

There should also be genuine political representation that speaks for every part of the community.

Group Work

1. What is social justice and how do you promote it in a peace-building context?

Social Justice refers to the following:

- Respect of fundamental rights;
- Equal distribution of resources;
- Accountability and transparency;
- People given equal opportunities (including gender);
- People's participation in decision making & making of laws.

2. How do you promote social justice in a peace-building context?

- By empowering citizens;
- By promoting equal distribution of resources- roads/housing/educational/health;
- Empowering civil society structures to ensure accountability of government;
- No conditions attached to funding agreements from international partners;
- Governments should budget for Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Community Based Organisations (CBOs);
- Institutionalisation of dialogue and confidence-building.

3. What institutions, at all levels, need strengthening in order to build peace? How do we strengthen them in relation to sustainable peace and peace building?

a) Sub-National Institutions:

- Youths;
- Women;
- Religious organisations; and
- Community Based Organisations (CBOs).

b) National Institutions:

- Parliaments: Mandates should include peace building and conflict resolution within their constituency;
- Human Rights Commissions: Add peace building to their mandate to create public awareness;
- Independent Electoral Commissions (IECs): Add peace building to their mandates;
- Ministries of Education: Add peace building to their mandates;
- Media: Should be strengthened to create awareness about peace building.

Note: The mandates of all the above institutions should be broadened to include peace building.

Measures:

- The above institutions should be funded to enable them take part in peace initiatives.
- The institutions must be made as independent as possible to enable them perform their work without undue interference.

c) Sub-Regional Measures

- Set up units to deal with Peace Building;
- Have finances and capacity to deal with peace building;
- Create and keep data bases on Peace Building;

- Give support to Peace builders.

4. What are the limits to current post conflict peace building, democracy and governance approaches?

- Lack of trust between peace building citizenry and government;
- Lack of resources to implement peace-building initiatives;
- Negotiating through oppressive systems;
- Colonisation and poverty of the mind;
- Lack of strong monitoring systems;
- Lack of ability to infuse multiple ethnic-social groups (exclusions);
- Engagement in only formal peace building as opposed for the social justice peace building (substantive);
- Peace building should be more proactive in facilitating the conceptualisation of alternative systems of government.

3. New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)

by

Chris Landsberg

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The origins of the NEPAD initiative can be located within the context of President Thabo Mbeki's views on African Renaissance, which he articulated during 1995 - 1997.

Mr Mbeki's view on African Renaissance was formed around the political, socio-cultural and economic dimensions. Under the political dimension, he believed that Africans need democracy that military dictatorships and one party systems do not work. Economically, the global reality favour free market structures, and hence globalisation. He thus believed that there is a need to bring Africa to the forefront and reintegrate it back into the global economy. In the socio-cultural dimension he realised the need to restore the dignity of Africans in the globe and hence a new form of Pan-Africanism.

Mr Mbeki realised that he had to engage Africa differently in order to cause fundamental change in Africa. In 1999, at the OAU summit in Algeria three Countries (Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria) were mandated by the OAU summit to steer Africa's debt relief and the campaign to bridge the digital divide.

In 2000 at the African summit in Togo, the above three countries who had already developed the Millennium African Recovery Plan (MARF), were mandated to engage the industrialised powers into a new partnership with Africa.

In 2001 at the OAU summit in Lusaka, Zambia, the OMEGA plan prepared by President Wade of Senegal and the MARF, prepared by Nigeria, South Africa and Algeria, were integrated to form the New African Initiative (NAI).

In 2001 at a summit in Abuja, NAI was transformed into New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is a new development model for Africa that looks at Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from abroad (North) as one way through which African economies can experience a take off. NEPAD is a development plan, which is an attempt by Africans to eradicate poverty. In order to end poverty, there is a need to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which requires stability, security and democracy.

NEPAD is focussed on policies that emphasise socio-economic regeneration, poverty alleviation and empowerment. These policies, however, cannot be achieved without peace and security, good political governance, democracy and economic and co-operate governance. The NEPAD needs to emphasise infrastructure development, which should focus on investment in health, education and market access to the markets in the North.

The challenge is how do we get the African elites (African governments) to become more accountable and transparent, although they signed all agreements on NEPAD? The other

challenge is how do we extract commitment from the North towards the NEPAD? The NEPAD was structured along five clusters each led by one country as follows:

Country	Cluster
Nigeria	- Co-operate and economic governance
Egypt	- Market access
Senegal	- Infrastructure
Algeria	- Human resource development
South Africa	- Peace, security and development

The five countries that lead the clusters above constitute a steering committee of NEPAD. Ten other countries from different regions of Africa were selected to join the five members of the steering committee to form the NEPAD implementation committee.

Critique on NEPAD

The following is an extract of a critique on NEPAD by individuals including Chris Landsberg. The critique includes proposals and recommendations for civil society engagement.

The NEPAD, launched by prominent African leaders in Abuja, Nigeria in October 2001, is a wide-ranging vision for promoting better government, ending Africa's wars and reducing poverty on the continent. A critique on NEPAD is important to help shape the emergence of what may turn out to be Africa's most critical development plan in this new millennium. The critique and proposals will also help to translate NEPAD's vision into a concrete plan of action.

The Peace and Security

The Peace and Security cluster contained in the NEPAD strategy document places emphasis on the traditional notion of security as absence of war. It identifies four priority areas:

- Prevention management and resolutions of conflicts;
- Peacemaking, peace keeping and peace enforcement;
- Post conflict reconciliation, rehabilitation and reconstruction and
- Combating the illicit proliferation of small arms, light weapons and landmines.

But the effective approach to African conflicts requires broadening of the national security beyond the state - centric and militarist dimensions and developing multifaceted responses. The following four pillars of peace and security are crucial:

- Human security as the bedrock for sustainable peace;
- Democracy and open governance;
- Transformation of violent conflicts through political processes; and
- Collective security for all African states.

Hence, practical customised and targeted immediate and long-term interventions at the local, national, sub- regional, regional and continental levels must be ensured in a manner commensurate with the magnitude of the crisis.

To realise the above, there is a need for a productive dialogue on democracy and good governance within the framework of the democratic control of security institutions and the assurance that the

basic human rights will be respected and protected. In particular, access must be provided for citizens to participate in the creation and sustenance of initiatives that proclaim to protect their best interests.

Democracy and Political Governance

The task of creating and maintaining a viable and legitimate state that is accessible, efficient, accountable, transparent and equitable remains one of the most critical and complicated challenges of the transformation process in Africa. Governance has been the major vehicle for attaining this legitimacy and viability. Fundamental to the notion of governance is the ability of the state to provide efficient and well functioning institutions and infrastructures of government - legally backed and socially coherent, which will together establish and maintain an enabling environment in which human security and human development can flourish.

Based on the identified need to monitor compliance to good governance by African states, the primary relationship of accountability to be monitored are the internal relationships between African governments and their own citizens, instead of external relationships of accountability between these governments and international donors. To ensure that this happens, there is a need to establish constitutionally empowered, independent national monitoring mechanisms, which will be staffed by credible and competent African sector specialists as opposed to foreign professional and research consultants.

Recommendations

1. NEPAD proponents should take all necessary steps to correct the belief and strong perception that its main targets for NEPAD is on foreign donors, especially G8 nations with the African people having played little or no part in the construction, design and formulation.
2. NEPAD leaders should take action to address the unclear legal and structural relationships between NEPAD, the OAU and succeeding body the AU as well as other programmes such as the Lagos Plan of Action. Leaders should professionalise the human resource base of regional institutions and establish an affective collaborative mechanism between the AU and sub-regional organisations.
3. The member states of the NEPAD arrangement should make the necessary constitutional, legislative and institutional reforms required in facilitating the implementation of its commitments to good governance and open societies. The signatory states should take alternative measures to implement the separation between the legislature, the executive and judiciary within their countries and guarantee judicial independence and legislative oversight of the executive arm of government.
4. The NEPAD states should ensure freedom of expression, freedom of publication and freedom of access to all information held by the states where precessions are not currently available. The African states should encourage the participatory role of the civil society, including that of a monitoring function. The point of ownership of the implementation plan would serve to consolidate the social contract between states and its citizenry. The state should design legislation referring to the public declaration of assets and financial interests by all public office holders.

4. Development, Aid and Peace

by

Dr. Abdun Noor

World Bank Consultant

4.1 Economic Framework of Development, Aid and Peace

Development Facts

- One billion people in the world live on just one US dollar a day
- 140 countries in the world are classified as Least Developed Countries (LDCs)
- One billion people in the world live under the poverty level
- One trillion of US dollars of investment flow have been released to the LDCs but no tangible results so far
- The LDCs have experienced fifty years of development and external aid but little or no progress so far

Why the following seven countries are grouped as follows?

- Botswana
- Korea
- Indonesia
- Bolivia
- Ghana
- Uganda
- Vietnam

Each of these countries moved from crisis to rapid development during the decades:

- Botswana
- Korea: During the decade of 1960's
- Indonesia
- Bolivia: During the decade of 1970's
- Ghana: During the decade of 1980's
- Uganda
- Vietnam: During the decade of 1990's

What's common in both of these countries?

- Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
- Tanzania

Unmitigated developmental failure!

DRC:

- Decades of large scale foreign aid left no trace of progress
- Steady flow of donor aid ignored, if not encouraged
- Incompetence
- Corruption
- Misguided Policies

Tanzania

- Poured US\$2 Billion over 20 years for building roads;
- No trace of good roads for good tourism and commerce
- Totally ineffective donor aid:

Donor aid at different times and different places can be:

- Highly effective
- Totally ineffective; and
- In between.

What Lessons Could we Draw?

External aid played significant role?

- Dramatic transformation of development policy;
- Training of public policy makers;
- Financial support of sector and policy reforms;
- Judicial expansion of public services

Helped in transformation of entire development sectors:

- Agricultural innovation: hybrid seeds, etc;
- Green revolution;
- Reduced diseases: river blindness, malaria, etc;
- Immunisation of childhood diseases

Touched on time, the lives of hundreds and hundreds of the people of the nation:

- Access to schools;
- Clear water;
- Sanitation;
- Electric power;

- Health clinics;
- Rural feeder roads;
- Irrigation.

Flow of Developmental Assistance:

3 Types of Aid:

- Official Development Finance (ODF)
 - All financing that flows from developed country governments to the developing world.
- Official Development Assistance (ODA)
 - Targeted to poor countries and 25% is at least grant;
- Bilateral Aid:
 - Often tied and must be used to purchase services and goods from the donor country;

Value of tied aid is reduced by 25%

- Less than Quarter of aid is tied,
- Trend of OECD Countries is away tied aid

Financial Flow to Developing Countries:

- Foreign aid rose steadily during 1970 and 1980's;
- ODA peaked in 1991 at US\$69 Billion;
- During 1990's all donors reduced aid as relative their respective GNPs:

Financial flow to developing countries:

- During 1990's all donors reduced aid as relative their respective GNPs
- 1% of GNP Nordic countries & Sweden
- 0.45% of GNP France
- 0.22% of GNP all OECD countries collectively
- 0.08% of GNP USA
- Foreign aid requirement is about 7-8% of recipient's GNP;

Why Reduction?

- Fiscal problems in OECD countries;
- Dramatic growth in private capital

Strategic influence of donors dictates flow of aid:

- Bilateral aid favoured former colonies and political allies;
- An undemocratic former colony got twice as much as a democratic non colony;
- Countries with poor management received as much as countries with good management;
- Nordic countries, favouring open economics and democracies targeted to poorer countries;

Why rethinking of aid?

- Shift in global economy and political support;
- Evidence of a world of integrated market;
- Surge of private capital flows from developed world;
- Declining flow of external resources;
- Our insights of effective and ineffective aid;
- Shift in development strategy in light of lessons learned;
- Addressing global poverty with millennium development goals

Surge in private capital:

- During 1970s and 1980s, the ODA was about 50% of all flows;
- During 1990s, the ODA was about 25% of all flows?
- Private capital is 250 billion in 1996; compared to millions in 1980;
- Most of it went to middle income countries;
- 26 middle-income countries received 95% of the private capital; rest went to remaining 140 countries;

Sustainable Development Beyond the Millennium:

- Foreign aid generates knowledge and flows money for effective development;
- The challenge is how to direct external aid, financial transfer of resources from rich to poor countries, for sustainable development beyond the millennium;

Sustainable development means that recipients demonstrate:

- Right timing for initiating reform of economic policies;
- Proactively generate political support of civil society;
- Communities to organise themselves to improve required services.

Effective aid means right mix of money and ideas:

- Because before countries reform, the money has little value;
- Money has large impact on low income countries with sound economic management;
- Right mix of ideas and knowledge

Effective aid means developing proper partnership:

- Partnership is a three way process with
 - Recipient countries;
 - Aid agencies who are conduit to development;
 - Donor countries

Effective aid means partnership with recipient countries:

- Design sound policies and development
- Encourage pro-active involvement of civil society;
- Addresses governance issues;

Effective aid means partnership with donor agencies which:

- Provide high impact assistance by aid agencies moving out from emphasis on disbursements and physical implementation;
- Stimulate policy reforms and institutional changes;
- Allow administrative budget for knowledge generation;

Effective aid means partnership with donor countries where:

- Citizens of donor countries support aid;
- They seek to transform the developing world with mutual collaboration and co-operation;
- They poise their aid for effective development.

Effective aid means effective development:

- When, planting, "seeds of hope" to the lives of hundreds millions of people one at a time;
- When development means:
 - More food during the meals;
 - Healthier babies;
 - More children in schools.

Lessons Drawn from Development Beyond the Millennium

Why following countries are grouped together?

- Botswana
- Indonesia
- Korea, Rep of
- Thailand

Why following countries are grouped together?

- Cote D'ivore
- Ethiopia
- Haiti
- Iran
- Nicaragua
- Zaire
- Zambia

Why following countries are grouped together?

- Bangladesh
- India
- Malawi
- Pakistan

**Different countries, different fortunes
1996 -1990**

No growers	% of the income	
	1996	1990
Cote D'ivore	11.6	6.7
Ethiopia	2.4	1.8
Haiti	7.3	4.5
Iran	29.0	18.8
Nicaragua	18.7	7.2
Zaire	5.1	2.2
Zambia	8.5	3.8

New thinking on development strategy:

- First flush of independence from colonial rule created optimism;
- New governments and their leaders were treated as agents of political, social and economic change;
- Domestic markets were non-existent and had poor capacity for faster growth;
- International market dominated by colonialists;
- Government-to-government bilateral aid considered as best way to lead development;

What is sound economic management?

- Economic policy;
- Institutional quality;
- Sustainable development
- Three corners of a triangle!

Money matters in good policy environment:

- Some countries received a lot of developmental assistance but incomes fell;
- Some countries received little aid, but income rose;
- Poor countries have the potential for rapid growth;
- With good management an additional 1% of GDP in aid increases growth by 0.5% point;
- With good management an additional 1% of GDP in aid increases leads to a decline in infant mortality of 0.9 percent;

Money matters - only in a good policy environment:

- Countries with better policies can grow faster, and reform can get them there as in Ghana and Bolivia;
- With good management an additional 1% of GDP in aid increases growth by 0.5% point;
- With good management an additional 1% of GDP in aid leads to a decline in infant mortality of 0.9 percent;
- In declining economies an average drop of 7% in per capita income led to a increase in poverty of 19 percent;

Economic policy:

- Relatively low rate of inflation
- Budget surplus, instead of large fiscal imbalance;
- Trade openness, compared to closed, trade regime;
- Over all stable macro economic environment

Institutional quality:

- Strength of rule of law;
- Protected property rights;
- Enhanced quality of public bureaucracy;
- Less prevalence of corruption

Sustainable development activities:

- Improves education and health
- Supports agricultural research and extension;
- Community driven or well managed developmental activities.

But the rosy optimism crashed!

- Failure of centrally planned economies;
- Corruption and accumulation wealth among a few;
- Broad economic failures;
- Disintegration of Africa by pursuing and clinging to a state-led strategy.

Waves of spectacular increases in income & exports:

- First in East Asian economies: Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore;
What is common among these 4 countries?
- Second, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia;
What is Common among these countries?
- Third, emergence of Chile: Why?
- Success of Mauritius & Botswana: Why?

First: Growth enhancing market oriented policies:

- Stable macro economic management;
- Effective law and order;
- Trade liberalisation;
- Provide public services only where private markets are unable to perform equitably (e.g., infrastructure, education).

Second: Broad improvements in quality of life:

- Higher personal and family income;
- Advancement in literacy and health;
- Environmentally sustainable development;
- Significant progress on millennium development goals.

We have six lessons:

- Financial aid work in a good policy environment
- Improvement in economic institutions and policies are key to success;
- Effective aid complements flow of private investment;
- Comparative "value added" of development projects;
- Aid nurtures reforms

Financial aid works in a good policy environment:

- Faster growth: Good economic management leads to 3.7% increase in GDP compared to 1% average developing country growth;
- Policy reforms such as stabilisation and trade liberalisation may add 2% to 3% to

- developing countries growth;
- Declining poverty reduction: 1% of GDP assistance leads to 1% decline in poverty:
- Gains in social indicators: 1% Decline in infant mortality;
 - US\$ 10 Billion
 - 25 Million people
 - 7 million people

What is the link?

- Channelled to poor countries with sound management and policy reforms, US\$10 billion would lift 25 million out of poverty, compared to 7 million when such money is allocated across the board;
- Success rate of investment projects, financed by the World Bank for roads, power and education, are 86% in countries with sound economic management, compared to 46% in countries with weak policies and institutions;

What is policy reform?

- Bolivia Vs Nicaragua
- In Bolivia aid came with reform package
- In Nicaragua it came without ties, leading to ineffective aid;
- Botswana in contrast to Tanzania
- Botswana designed correct policies and developed strong institutions;
- Tanzania, failure with experiments

Way to policy reforms!

- Disseminating knowledge, educating officials stimulating public debate;
- Economic liberalisation:
- Overseas education of policy makers;
 - Berkeley trained groups of intellectuals of East Asian countries in 1960s and 1970s
 - Harvard trained senior officials of India, Pakistan during 1960s and 1970s;
 - Politicians and officials trained in USA, engineered impressive policy reforms of Latin American countries in 1980s and 1990s

Improvement in Economic institutions and policies are key to success;

- Sharp improvement in governance and public reform policies;
- 60 million out of poverty;
- Aid should not "buy" policy reforms;
- Civil societies desire reform, foreign aid provides ideas for reform with training, and

- higher education;
- Make financing conditional on adoption of certain policies;
- Success and failures of policy-based adjustment operations could be predicted on (a) Whether the leader had been democratically elected or not (Figure 7) and (b) How long the leader has been in power;
- New countries that arise in post conflict situations have higher probability of success rate;
- Conditionality is unlikely to bring lasting change and reform if there was no domestic movement for change;
- Aid helps good government to survive long enough to solve economic problems;

Effective aid complements flow of private investment:

- In countries with sound economic management, foreign aid does not replace private initiative;
- Aid acts as a magnet and "crowds in" private initiative;
- US\$1 of aid brings in US\$2 of private capital; indicates higher confidence and sense of security;
- In highly distorted economic environment, aid "crowds out" private investment

Comparative "Value Added" of development projects:

- Strengthen institutions
- Reform policies
- Most aid is devoted to investment projects: roads, water supply, education;
- Aid finance is fungible: Target reform of the entire sectors;
- Emphasise overall quality and policy of institutions

Presence of pro-active civil society:

- Develop participatory approach to service delivery

4.2 Five Strategies for the Millennium

Introduction

Assessing aid:

- Aid spurs growth in a good policy environment
- Donors cannot dictate policies
- Donors cannot dictate expenditures

What is needed is to develop new ideas about how Nigerian politics should operate, something that the World Bank, the IMF, and the bilateral donors cannot provide. Only the Nigerians can do that. (Nigeria)

Aid nurtures reforms:

- Even on most distorted economic environments;
- Requires focus on ideas and not money;
- Requires patience as developmental change is a long - term process

Five strategies for the millennium:

- Target low-income countries with sound economic management;
- Direct policy-based aid;
- Tailor aid activities to country and sector conditions;
- Focus on transmitting knowledge and creating new knowledge;
- Aid considers alternatives;

Target low-income countries with sound economic management:

- Till 1990s, aid has gone in equal amounts to well managed poor countries and to poorly managed countries with past colonial ties;
- Most middle-income countries with colonial and imperial legacy, though do not desperately require aid, still receive it;
- Among low-income countries with sound economic management:
 - Aid is a catalyst for growth;
 - Rapid growth in social indicators;
 - Higher private investment;

Direct policy-based aid:

- To nurture policy reforms among credible reformers;
- Prefer new governments in post - conflict countries;
- Countries with poor policies and non-credible reform measure should: Receive modest aid;

- Training of policy makers, decision makers, leaders;
- Transmitting development experience of other countries;
- Developing civil society capacity for informed policy debate;
- Patient role for disseminating ideas;
- Counter past practices.

Tailor aid activities to country and sector conditions:

- Most aid is fungible;
- What you see is not what you get!
- Determine efficacy of public spending;
- Overall allocation

Focus on transmitting knowledge and creating new knowledge:

- Support institutions;
- Support policy reforms;
- Encourage greater participation of local community;

Consider alternative approach:

- Capture "window of opportunity" one at a time;

Impact of institution building and policy reform:

- At the moment, about one third of the developing world are sunk in mass poverty but demonstrate good policies and institutions;
- Because of the wave of policy reforms and institution building that has swept through poor countries;
- During the 1980s and 1990s, there was huge advances in the quality of management in developing countries;
- Further improvement of the same magnitude could add a full percentage point of developing countries growth;

Impact of further institution building and policy reform:

- An even bigger assault on global poverty;
- Lift another 60 million people out of the poverty abyss.

Choice for the millennium is clear:

- We know which countries will have high impact of aid provided;
- Countries with sound economic management;

We know the chief ingredients of sound economic management are:

- Good policy
- Strong institutions;
- Sustainable development
- Each requires peace. Without peace development cannot take place.

Where shall we focus our aid?

- To high impact countries of the upper right quadrant;
- Because aid is far more effective than in countries in other quadrants, donors are already taking into account poverty and policies in determining where to allocate funds.

Being focused means:

- Nearly four times as many people could be lifted out of poverty;
- If aid became much more effective, there would be more of it,
- Rapid poverty reduction will eliminate/reduce incidence of greed, which is principal cause of conflict;
- Demonstrated effectiveness will generate greater support for development

Actually not very much:

- Suppose world community raised an extra US\$10 Billion and allocated it proportionately to existing aid allocations, what will happen?

Extra aid could raise 7 million people out of poverty

Be focussed:

- Instead we decide to allocate the extra US\$ 10 billion to countries of high impact quadrant. The extra impact is dramatic!
- 25 million people would be raised out of poverty in 32 countries, compared to 7 million poor people dispersed in 113 developing countries

A word of caution:

- Developed world could bring in money and ideas, but they cannot provide peace. This ought to originate from the country.

Aid and reform in Africa:

- Reform is driven primarily by domestic factors (country "ownership");
- In Ghana and Uganda finance increased as policies improved, strengthening the benefits of reform and sustaining political support for them;
- Large-scale finance to poor policy countries sustained poor policies.

Ultimately economic reform was only politically sustainable because some results emerged quickly (Ghana).

The conditions helped push the reform agenda for the reform minded parts of the government with the support of the President. Conditionality was in that context a helpful tool (Uganda).

Conditionality is relatively important tool in terms of bringing about policy change unless the reform measures are supported by the political leadership (Zambia).

Agenda

- Post conflict reconstruction in context;
- Lessons from conflict;
- A new reconstruction framework;
- Instruments of Bank assistance to conflict-affected countries.

Post-conflict reconstruction in context:

- Since 1980, more than 50 countries have experienced significant periods of conflict;
- Complete breakdown of states
- 15 of the 20 poorest countries had major conflict in the past 15 years;
- During 1990s, nearly all countries in Africa have either experienced conflict or share borders with countries with major conflict;
- Relatively rich country e.g. Yugoslavia slides into poverty
- 30 countries have had more than 10 per cent of population displaced;
- 10 countries have had more than 40 percent displaced;
- Duration of conflict is long drawn;
- Whole generations have grown up in cultures of armed warfare and violence
- Transition to peace is broken with repeated cycles of violence
- Interspersed with insecurity, and uncertainty
- Wiped out achievements of decades of economic and social development;
- Left legacy of militarised and divided societies;
- Decimated institutional capacity;
- ODA devoted to relief increased from 2% in 1989 to 10% in 1994
- Peace Building operation costs international community \$3 billion in 1995

Lesson from conflict:

- Conflicts are due to:
 - Ethnic or religious competitions
 - Competition for scarce resources
 - Actions of external actors;
 - Local political entrepreneurs;
 - Unequal patterns of distribution of resources;
 - Fault lines of social tension

A view from the academia: Laura Nathan Centre Conflict Resolution University of Cape Town:

- Authoritarian rule
- Exclusion of minorities from government;
- Socio economic deprivation combined with inequity
- Weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage normal conflict associated with social economic transformation

Ruha Auvinen & Wayne Nafiger: World Institute for Development economic research study of 124 countries between 1980 and 1995:

Civil conflict is related with;

- Stagnation and decline in real GDP;
- A high ratio of military expenditure to national income;
- Slow growth in average food production

Relative deprivation explains political conflict:

- Humanitarian emergencies by presence of "four horsemen of apocalypse"
- Death
- Displacement
- Hunger
- Disease

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR):

- 1951, 33 staff, annual budget of US\$300,000
- 1991, 5000 staff, annual budget of US\$1 Billion
- Between 1989 & 1998, 101 civil war erupted;
- Incidence 55 in 1992, 34 in 1997, 36 in 1998; and no significant abatement since.
- 22 million refugees in over 120 countries;

The World Bank's Role in Post Conflict Reconstruction:

- The Bank's role is to finance & facilitate reconstruction in member countries;
- Bank is not in charge of peace making or peacekeeping, they are functions of UN & other regional organisations;
- Bank does not question political character of a member & does not interfere in domestic political affairs of a member;
- Bank does not operate in the territory of a member country without approval of that member
- Bank is not relief agency;
- What then could be the role of the World Bank?

Bank assistance and conflict:

- Growing recognition of the link between poverty reduction and conflict prevention
- Economic and social stability and human security are preconditions for sustainable development;
- Conflict affects not only the country at war, but may spill over to other countries and have regional implications
- Need for increased understanding of the root causes, catalysts, indicators and policy implications of conflict and post-conflict recovery through analytical work;
- Appropriate interventions to finance emergency recovery assistance in countries in transition from conflict;
- Shift from 'post conflict' focus to 'conflict prevention and reconstruction.'

Development co-operation and conflict:

- Recognition that economic and social stability are preconditions for sustainable development;
- Recognition that violent conflict affects the Bank's core mission of poverty reduction
- Different bank engagement in countries that are:
 - Vulnerable to conflict
 - In conflict
 - In transition from conflict

Post conflict reconstruction:

- Two overall observations:
- Reconstruction does not mean rebuilding of the physical infrastructure nor signify rebuilding of socio-economic infrastructure that existed before the onset of conflict;
- Conflict, often transforms a society and a return to the past may not be desirable possible
- First: To facilitate transition to peace after hostilities have ceased;
- Second: Rebuild the country's socio economic framework;
- Developed an integrated package of reconstruction assistance

Elements of integrated package of reconstruction assistance:

- Jump-start the economy through series of investments;
- Re-establish framework of governance;
- Repair important physical infrastructure;
- Rebuild and maintain key social infrastructure;
- Target assistance to those affected by war;
- Support land mine action program
- Normalise financial borrowing arrangements

Jump-start the economy through series of investments:

- Design investment in key productive sectors;
- Create the conditions for resumption of trade, savings and foreign investments;
- Promote macro-economic stabilisation;
- Rehabilitate financial institutions;
- Restore appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks

Re-establish framework of governance:

- Strengthening government institutions;
- Restoring law and order;
- Enabling the organisations of civil society to work effectively.

Repair important physical infrastructure:

- Identify key transport channels & repair, rebuild;
- Communication channels & path;
- Utility and power networks;

Rebuild and maintain key social infrastructure:

- Financing of health and education, including recurrent costs;

Target assistance to those affected by war:

- Settlement of displaced populations;
- Demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants;
- Revitalisation of disrupted local communities by credit lines to subsistence agriculture and micro enterprises;
- Support to female-headed households and similar vulnerable groups;

Support land mine action program;

- Mine surveys and demising of key infrastructure;
- Return of normal life of populations living in mine - polluted areas;

Normalise financial borrowing arrangements:

- Planning workout of arrears;
- Planning of debt rescheduling;
- Designing longer path to financial normalisation

Instruments of Bank Assistance to Conflict-Affected Countries:

- Watching brief usually during the conflict when no active portfolio is possible to keep track of developments and build a knowledge base useful for future Bank's interventions;
- Transitional support strategy detailed assessment of the conditions in a country and planning of the next steps;
- Early reconstruction of small-scale activities in response to urgent country needs; also pilot activities enhancing learning for the design of later larger-scale programs;
- Post-conflict reconstruction: as conditions permit, a large-scale reconstruction program
- Conflict analysis: socio-economic analysis, aiming to understand and reduce causes and consequences of violent conflict;

The conflict prevention and reconstruction unit:

- Conflict prevention and reconstruction unit: Support to country teams:
 - A focal point for partnership with other organisations involved in post-conflict reconstruction;
 - Specific expertise (mine action, demobilisation, population reintegration) to the Bank's operational staff;
 - Accelerating the institutional learning process and disseminating information on post-conflict reconstruction issues;
- Country teams: Overall responsibility for conflict prevention and reconstruction work.

The Post-Conflict Fund (PCF)

An instrument within the Bank development grant facility financing assistance to conflict-affected countries through grants;

- Allows for speedy and flexible funding of innovative work that cannot be financed under the regular bank instruments;
- Support planning, piloting, and analysis of reconstruction activities by government and partner organisations;
- Catalyst of bilateral contributions to the countries and a preparatory mechanism for the regular Bank lending;
- Over 1998-2002 accumulated \$45 million, of which:
 - \$40,9 million approved in some 110 grants to 35 countries
 - \$26,5 million disbursed
- IDP/Refugee/Community reintegration, such as the "Burundi Community Rehabilitation" project the self-reliance fund for the internally displaced in Georgia, and the "Reintegration of vulnerable street children" project in Kinshasa, DRC
- Social sector support, such as the "Afghan Female Teachers In-service Training" project in Peshawar, Pakistan, the program for the empowerment of women in Tajikistan, and the "War Widows and Welfare" project in Indonesia;
- Private sector work, such as the "Knitting Together Nations" project in Bosnia;
- Conflict prevention through inter-ethnic dialog and consensus building, such as the conflict prevention program in Burundi and the world links project in Rwanda.

Policy framework:

1995: Operational policy "Emergency recovery assistance"

1997: "Framework for World Bank involvement in post-conflict reconstruction"

1997: Operational guidelines for financing landmine clearance

1998: OECD "The World Bank's experience with post-conflict reconstruction"

2001: Operational policy 2.30 "Development co-operation and conflict"

Development Lessons from Five Conflict Countries Assisted by The World Bank

Largely tailored assistance to the characteristics of the specific country situation

- Draw the lessons learned - negative as well as positive - from the World Bank's experience;
- Review financing arrangements, donor co-ordination, the local organisational architecture, and the division of responsibilities between external and internal entities;
- Summarises the key requirements for good aid management from the recipient side.

West Bank and Gaza:

- Clear legitimacy of the local authority;
- Substantial human resources;
- No internal ethnic differences;
- Constant interaction and negotiation with the other principal party;
- Administrative character of the Palestinian Authority and pace and tone of relations with Israel largely influenced and conditioned the donor strategy.

In Bosnia:

- Hostility between ethnic groups;
- Three distinctive separate units (Bosnia core, Republic of Srbska, and Herzegovina);
- Difficulty of integration for locally-staffed project implementation units (PIUs) into regular government ministries;
- Keeping a "single reconstruction program" together; and
- Fostering some modicum of internal co-operation.

In Lebanon:

- Fatigue from the prolonged civil war yielded an inter-ethnic agreement for joint control and decision-making, with general oversight from Syria;
- The challenge was inter-ethnic allocation of resources within a unified structure.

In Kosovo:

- The challenge of administrative and physical reconstruction;
- Co-existence of the international administration with parallel crypto-government structures;
- Ensuing confusion of lines of authority and responsibility for service delivery;
- Complicated challenge of reconstruction.

In East Timor:

- Ethnic homogeneity coexists with internal political differences;
- Political legitimacy arise from elections;
- Government structures and administrative capacity are non-existent;
- Human resources very weak;
- Main challenges: encouraging conflict resolution and progressively reducing the dependence on expatriates.

Substantial diversity of experience emerge from all post-conflict cases:

- Very different mix and unique circumstances;
- Strong ethnic differences as in Bosnia and Lebanon, but deeply felt common religion and culture;
- Low administrative capacity as in East Timor, but potential for vigorous private initiative.

Substantial diversity of experience:

- Entrepreneurship as in Palestine; concurrent with weak central governance; but strong traditional social structures at the local level;
- A history of persistent conflict, as in Kosovo, but potentially important customary mechanisms of conflict resolution;
- Relatively large size and population of Afghanistan, with rugged terrain and arid climate, and sheer poverty.

Role of external developmental agencies:

- All of individual country characteristics increases the complexity and difficulty of the reconstruction challenge to be conducted by the external developmental agencies;

The lessons we may draw

First: Clarity of mandate

- A mandate flowing out of a political resolution is the first requirement for effective external assistance in post-conflict situations. Without such a mandate, the external donors cannot obtain the active co-operation of local entities and parties;
- In all four post-conflict cases, a political resolution sanctioned internationally, had to be achieved before organised economic and reconstruction assistance could begin to flow;
- Prior to such a resolution, even humanitarian assistance was inevitably fragmented and turf-dominated.

Second: Genuine partnership

- Genuine partnership among the key international institutions concerned is a corollary of the need for a clear mandate;
- Partnership enabled each institution to use its comparative advantage, improved the cohesion and quality of assistance, and offered a predictable and clear interface for the local authorities;
- Experience of the NGOs on the ground, to allow a diversity of multilateral involvement;
- But the need for partnership should not be allowed to lead to erecting firewalls between different agencies activities;
- In some cases, problems have arisen from administration of one particular trust fund, without the possibility of dialogue with or compensating intervention from other donors.

Third: Economic policy issues must not be neglected

- Even though the priority in post-conflict cases is naturally an urgent short-term relief, over long-term reconstruction needs, economic policy dialogue needs not to be intensive;
- But when economic policy issues were entirely disregarded; initial quick wins in relief were obtained at the expense of sustainable reconstruction results down the line;

Fourth: Centripetal tendencies by the local counterpart entity should be carefully watched

- Priority assistance must be encouragement of capacity building in the institutions of government;
- Understanding the local population as the ultimate client;
- In Afghanistan, the resiliency of village social structures combined with the lessons of history ought to caution against prescriptive central government intervention;
- Institutions of the pro-government, to act as a conduit to channel and facilitate local initiative.

Fifth: A pro-active communication strategy

- To build realistic public expectations;
- To pre-empt the criticism that inevitably follows the initial euphoria in post-conflict

circumstances;

- The donor community is constantly on the defensive - particularly concerning the speed of disbursements, the allocations of funds to activities benefiting different interests, and the unavoidable occasional diversion of funds;
- Time is of the essence for the effectiveness of assistance in post-conflict situations.

Sixth: Financing arrangements and donor co-ordination

- Mixed or joint-financing entailing one or more Trust Funds (TFs);
- TFs need to perform both trustee and executive functions.

Key strategic criteria for TFs are five:

- Simplicity and flexibility in funding and administering arrangements;
- Construct a workable interface with the local reconstruction agency;
- Provide donors with clear advantages for participating;
- Foster transparency, helping to prevent suspicion and resentment; and
- Build-in openings for citizens' "voice".

Seventh: A Realistic government budget

- Which reflects a coherent and agreed program of economic and social activities, that the local reconstruction agency and the donor funding entity should interact;
- Which donors can see better prospects for implementation of their priority activities than through isolated interventions;
- Where allocation of resources can be made clear to all parties;
- Where the practice of public hearings, open debate, and habits of compromise can best be introduced.

A few budget experience:

- Fiscal transparency, important in all cases, is vital in post-conflict situations, where every shadow is misinterpreted;
- Failure to insist from the start on a reasonable and realistic budget partly eroded the support for the reconstruction agency in WBG;
- In Bosnia, there was one budget for the Bosnian federation, and one for Republic of Srbska, but the de facto separate Croat unit within the federation obtained much of its revenue from outside of Bosnia (i.e. from Croatia).

Eight: Essential to stick to the budgetary basics

- Requirement of a single budget should not be misunderstood as suggesting application of sophisticated budgetary systems.

Budgetary Basic:

- A simple functional classification complemented by the basic economic classification, with few line items;
- A cash-based budget;
- A streamlined procedure for financial allocation decisions;
- A single-entry bookkeeping;
- An agile payments mechanism (even if it needs to be contracted-out during an initial period); and
- A robust but selective audit clearly focused on financial integrity.

Nine: It's not essential to have a single Trust Fund

- With agreed program of activities and a realistic budget reflecting its financial implications, it is not absolutely essential to have a single Trust Fund;
- Several TFs can conceivably coexist with acceptable effectiveness with the five preconditions;
- In the absence of a suitable programmatic and budgetary framework, a unified TF alone will not produce the desired outcomes.

Some examples of Trust Funds:

- In WBG, the host fund financed the bulk of recurrent expenditure,
- In Bosnia, good results were achieved by small bank projects in every sector serving as platforms to which other donor co-financing was anchored, and some 17 TFs were established.
- In situations where recurrent costs are not covered by domestic resources, likely to be the situation in Afghanistan for some time to come, and must be funded through a TF, the rationale for separate project-based trust funds would be weak.

Five separate categories of programs:

- Genuine "start-up" costs (fully transitional)
- Recurrent costs (Partly transitional)
- Investment (semi-permanent);
- Special programs (e.g., de-mining); and
- Non-project technical assistance.
Note: Appropriate mechanisms for allocation, disbursement, and monitoring would differ across the five program categories.

Ten: Non-project Technical Assistance (TA) has limited value

- Non-project TA expenditures are prone to expensive advisory activities of limited value, so an especially close watch is advisable;
- TA tied to services of donor nationals should not be included in a TF;

- Some non-project TA is inevitable in post-conflict situations but should not be allowed to replace whatever local capacity exists (or to short-circuit its creation);
- TA should not aggravate local capacity problems further by introducing overly complex systems or methods unsuited to local circumstances and constraints;
- Non-project TA activities should be linked with a host-government capacity-building program, and as a rule should not occur in isolation;
- Funds should not be fully committed, and a significant cushion should be maintained for urgent TA needs as they arise;
- TA for institutional capacity building at the sector level should be anchored onto a major project in that sector;
- TA given to corresponding Project Implementation Unit (PIU).

Eleven: Strict earmarking would negate the very purpose of TFs

- Comparative worth of different programs difficult to scrutinise and in effect transferring authority over expenditure programming from the recipient government to the donors;
- Placing all donor aid into a common pool should be facilitated by prior specification of the broad expenditure priorities and corresponding reporting requirements, since all donors have their own requirements and preferences;
- Challenge is to create a mechanism that will preclude earmarking to specific activities while still giving donors confirmation that their assistance is contributing to the financing of priority programs.

Twelve: Monitor budget expenditure carefully

- For project aid, both physical and financial monitoring methods are fairly standard and well-established, including some measurement of results;
- Monitor the (agreed) broad composition of expenditure - with special attention to priority expenditure, e.g., restoration of basic services such as primary education and basic health;
- Finance large discrete categories of expenditure that entail an easy payment mechanism - e.g., salaries and pensions;
- Engage in close dialogue among the donors and with the recipient government on policy affecting those categories of expenditure (e.g. employment and wage policy).

5. Privatising Peace
by
Abdel Fatau Musah
Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA)

5.1 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs)

Dr. Abdel-Fatau Musah opened his talk on the subject by noting that public-private partnerships are not a new phenomenon. They lay at the base of the remarkable industrialisation drive in Japan after World War II and also sparked industrialisation later in such countries as South Korea and Taiwan (see Meier, G.M and J.E. Rauch, *Leading Issues in Economic Development*, Oxford University Press, 2000). In the developed world, such partnerships have been applied at the local government level to spur the provision of public goods and services, such as recreational and educational facilities, one-stop resource centres and garbage disposal. Popularly defined, PPPs are arrangements between government and the private sector/CSOs for the purposes of sustainable development.

In the post-cold war era, PPPs have taken on new forms, such as the on-going Multi-Stakeholder Processes (MSPs) which aim to bring together various major stakeholders in a new form of dialogue, decision-finding/making to ensure accountability, responsibility, transparency and participation in matters affecting livelihoods - lobbies, campaigns, etc.

Dr Musah noted that PPP arrangements become problematic and contentious when they touch on security - the privatisation of peace. Traditionally, the entire notion of the state has revolved around security and the ability of the state to generate and project power by exercising a monopoly over the instruments of coercion (Weber, Tilly). However, in many developed countries, private security companies have already breached such monopoly, securing control over such areas as prison security (Group 4 in the UK), airport security and guarding sensitive installations. In Africa, where conflicts have ravaged many societies, the private sector has teamed up with factions in active war-fighting. This has provoked fiery debate and controversy due principally to the nature and modus operandi of the privateers.

As a rule, private military companies have teamed up with extracting companies in operations that aim at helping beleaguered leaders and warlords in resource-laden countries to wage war in the situation of civil wars. In return, the mercenary-multinational companies receive lucrative mining concessions. The lack of transparency, public attitudes towards mercenaries and the mortgaging of mineral resources have provoked outrage from sections of civil society and activists in the affected countries.

Dr. Musah illustrated this new phenomenon by describing the role of the partnership between two closely related private military companies - the now defunct South Africa-based Executive Outcomes and the UK-based Sandline International - a mining complex linked to the PMCs - Branch Energy and Diamond Works - and various Sierra Leonean governments in the decade-old civil war in the West African state. For example in 1997, the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Sierra Leon army overthrew the incumbent President, Tejan Kabbah. Dr. Musah

hinted that there was strong suspicion that the mercenary groups played a role in the coup by supplying weapons to the rebels. While in exile, however, Kabbah sought assistance from Sandline to return his government to power. For an initial assistance of \$10 million, the regime ceded 30% of the country's diamond ferrous land mass worth \$200 million to the mercenary group and its mining partners.

He exposed the complex networks that are behind such exploitation within the shadow/parallel world economy. He also noted that such networks that incorporate mercenary companies, leading political figures in Africa, UK, France and the US are those fuelling the wars in such countries as Angola, the DRC, Nigeria, Columbia and the former Yugoslav states. They are also responsible for illegal arms flows, resource appropriation and grave human right violations.

Dr Musah noted that, these developments are occurring in an era when the call for transparency and accountability, anti-corruption and good governance are high on the agenda. He noted that conflict is the key demand factor for the continued proliferation of combat private military companies and their involvement in conflicts that keep the wars going.

Dr. Musah called for the building up of the capacity of civil society, peace groups and particularly the media, to counter this new trend in peace privatisation. In particular, he called for the strengthening of their investigative capacity to expose the murky deals being struck within conflict zones that fuel corruption and a lack of accountability. Finally, he called for the establishment and strengthening of networks between NGOs in Africa and the North in order to increase their advocacy role. The aim is to criminalise the war privateers, exercise oversight over the way African governments dispose of national assets and shift the emphasis of conflict management from violent to non-violent means.

5.2 Violence, Force and Conflict - Nature, Causes and Consequences

Relationship between Violence and Force

Force aims at authority, endeavouring to bring about an automatic obedience. A thrust of force is required by the state to maintain the status quo. Violence aims at smashing that authority - to undermine that status quo.

The state institutions, i.e., police, army, courts and prisons, maintain the legitimacy and utility of controlled force of the state. The violence of the mob that requires police force to control it (like anti capitalist demonstrations, violent strikes and demonstrations) is illegitimate and dysfunctional (anarchist) violence against the state.

Violence and Power

Power is the human ability for all to consent. But violence is the means of coercion. Whereas violence always requires justification in relation to the end that it serves, power is an end in itself and requires no justification but legitimacy. Power and violence are hence opposites; where one rules absolutely, the other is absent. Violence appears where power is in jeopardy. The less power (popular support) a government wields, the more it will have to resort to violence.

Power is the ability to make and enforce decisions on matters of major social importance.

Authority is, however, needed to make such decisions. Violence is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing one's will upon another, where the imposition is held illegitimate. Force is the capacity to impose, or the act of imposing one's will upon another, where the imposition is held to be legitimate.

Violence as a Function of Conflict

A composite definition of conflict

A social and psychological condition that arises out of desire, demand or competition within or between individuals or juridical persons, groups or states striving for mutually exclusive goals and values and which goals and values may be attained fully or partially only through a position of strength, dominance, compromise or sacrifice.

Some elements of conflicts

- Conflicts may be violent or non violent;
- Conflicts may be destructive or constructive;
- Conflict is a process (not an event);
- Conflict is a means (not an end);
- Conflict may lead to progress or retrogression.

Sources and types of violence

i) Cultural violence/Direct violence

- Ethnicity
- Religion
- Ideology
- Cultural imposition
- Identity crises

ii) Structural Violence/ Indirect violence

a) Political governance

- Bad governance;
- Over-centralisation;
- One party/military rule;
- Discrimination/exclusion;
- Poor leadership;
- Dependency syndrome;
- Warlordism.

b) Corporate Governance

- Transparency and accountability;
- Patrimonial system and
- Resource appropriation.

iii) Grievance

- Marginalisation;
- Food/water insecurity;
- Social neglect;
- Environmental degradation;
- Youth crisis.

iv) External sources of violence

a) Globalisation

- International financial and extraction system;
- Trade relations;
- International criminal networks;
- Strategic interests;
- Privatisation of security.

b) Inter African Tensions

- Familial/personal ties;
- Envy.

The changing nature of violence

- Deterrence - NATO Vs Warsaw Pact
- Economics Vs Ideology
- The Non Aligned Movement
- Interstate and proxy wars
- Acute structural violence

Post conflict war (enhanced globalisation)

- Liberalisation and Economics
- Widening divides in a Global village
- Information Revolution, glaring contrasts and the CNN Effect
- Violent spill-over

Typology of Post War Conflicts

Factors or Triggers

- a) The wealth-poverty divide
- b) Environmental degradation
- c) Identity crisis
- d) Elite vulnerability

Epilogue Wars and Prologue Wars

- Epilogue wars - indicative of past trends, e.g., spill-over decolonisation and proxy wars (Angola, Afghanistan, the DRC)
- Prologue Wars - Indicative of future trends, e.g., The Gulf War, The Zapatista Revolt (1994), Sierra Leone (1991) - Anti elite war fuelled by wealth - poverty divide or resources wars.

Sub categories of conflicts

- International conflicts- rare;
- Conflicts which were ideologically motivated, in which colonial rule was confronted by one or more organised armed movements, but which have continued even after decolonisation and the cold war; the conflicts have since changed their nature - Angola, Sri Lanka, Columbia;
- Internal conflicts caused by state failure and collapse of institutions and often spurred by resources, anti-elite grievances - Liberia, Sierra Leone, DRC, Mexico (Chipaz);
- Conflicts spurred by empire break up and emergence of new states - Georgia/Abkhazia, Azerbaijan/Nagorno - Karabakh, Azerbaijan/Armenia, former Yugoslavia;
- Internal identity wars - Kosovo, Macedonia, Somalia, Indonesia (East Timor);
- Rationalised internal conflicts, often spurred by predatory motives - DRC, Sierra Leone.

6. Peace-building and Conflict-Sensitive Development

by

Susanne Nebel

Director, Africa Program, ASPR

6.1 Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development

Governmental and NGOs alike recognise the need for more conflict sensitive programme planning, monitoring and management. This is due to the growing understanding of conflict, peace and development over the past five years. It is also a response to the need for more effective programmes with demonstrable positive impact and pressure also for programmes, which minimise the possible negative consequences of humanitarian assistance. Development assistance can ameliorate and exacerbate the root causes of violent conflict whereas war and violence undermine the benefits of development, long-term stability, prosperity and peace.

New awareness of donors has highlighted the need to address root causes of conflict to ensure a secure environment for development. The need to explore how development co-operation progresses towards conflict prevention objectives and the cost of conflict cannot be sustained.

Why conflict-sensitive approaches to development:

Humanitarian assistance can exacerbate conflict by;

- Cementing divisions between conflicting groups;
- Entrenchment of war economies and prolongation of war;
- Distortion of social relations;
- Entrenches inequalities;
- Elite and/or armed group benefit from unrest e.g. Liberia and Somalia.

Example:

Somalia 1993: aid and the humanitarian response

Development processes can exacerbate conflict if it is inadequately planned or inappropriately targeted. Programmes can marginalise vulnerable groups and overlook underlying root causes of poverty. This deepens inequality and increase tensions, thus contributing to the risk of violent conflict. Consequently, donors are attempting to revise policy frameworks with emphasis on structural stability i.e. support for good governance, human rights, civil society.

Example:

Mahaweli programme in Sri Lanka

Examples of rehabilitation and development activities with a focus on conflict prevention:

Rapid change project/refugees in Malawi: Improved public services (health centres, schools, water points) for local population hosting Mozambican refugees. Benefited both.

Pluralism and participation in Mozambique: Donors played a major role in keeping the first elections on schedule and supporting the transformation of RENAMO from a military movement into a political party.

Disarmament in Mozambique: The weapon to Ploughshares projects collects and destroys weapons in exchange for tools and other items for income generation activities. Supported by public peace education and training.

Impact of EU engagement in Ethiopia found that EU supported large scale commercial farming enterprises deepened inequality, restricted access to vital resources and increased tensions between competing pastoralist groups and between pastoralists and the state.

Secure environment is a prerequisite for poverty reduction:

War and violence, if left unchecked may undermine the benefits of development. Security, sector reform, poverty reduction, and sustainable development are most likely to occur when:

- Political systems facilitate equitable distribution of economic and political power;
- The fruits of development are equitably shared;
- The costs of conflict cannot be sustained;

6.2 Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)

Dr. Nebel used the Conflict Impact Assessment practical working tool for prioritising development assistance in unstable situations issued by the Conflict Prevention Network and the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. The working tool has been designed to assist practitioners to identify significant problem areas that have potential to lead to violent conflict in a given country. It can be applied in particular to countries where tensions are apparent, but where there is not yet major violence outbreak.

This tool has been devised within the framework of the approach of the European Commission to peace-building and conflict prevention. In particular it is based on the methodology and definitions set out in the Commission's "Practical guide on peace-building and conflict prevention".

How to use the CIAS Tool

Step 1: Identify Significant Problem Areas

Step 2: Assessing Problem Areas

Assess the significance of the remaining problem areas with the help of specific questions organised in the tables provided in the annex.

Step 3: By working through the first two steps you will have identified key problem areas in a given country that should be addressed as a priority. How to address the key problem areas and how to define the action towards preventing violent outbreak of conflict will depend on the agenda of aid agencies, their partners and stakeholders.

Outlined below is an overview of the root causes of violent conflict and related problem areas that figure in the Commissions's Practical guide on peace-building and conflict prevention, (see diagram next page „Overview of the root-causes of violent conflict and related problem areas“).

However, during the session Dr. Nebel raised the question to widen the scope of the root causes of conflict approach and add other factors which certainly also contribute to exacerbating and ameliorating conflicts such as the attitudes and relations between the protagonists of a conflict and factors which prolong violence such as what motivates politicians, warlords and others to continue with the war. This debate was enriched by the presentation of Dr. Fatau who contributed to this with his presentation on privatising the security sector. It was clear from his presentation that the political economy approach which highlights the factors prolonging the war was inspired by the greed and grievance debate.

Theories of Action


As is evident in the literature all three approaches on how to bring about change to the conflict situation strongly influence indicators of success and process. The root causes approach is based on the assumption that people fight because they have suffered material and political grievances, such as socio-economic inequality, cultural discrimination, marginalisation, lack of political participation and also poverty. Actions towards addressing these problems in order to end the conflict range from empowering people to address the conflicts in a non-violent way, emphasising the transformative powers of conflict. Instruments for action are development aid, political and economic reform and different forms of political advocacy.

The approach that focuses on individuals, their attitudes and relations assumes that violence occurs when relationships have been disturbed by prejudice, past experiences and lack of communication. Therefore, building trust, enhancing personal relationships and fostering communication between the conflict parties is considered important. Methods of addressing these problems are mediation and facilitation, problem-solving workshops, dialogue programmes, joint group work, tours, media work and action projects.

The political economy approach highlights the factors prolonging the violence such as incentive systems which motivate politicians, warlords and others to continue with the war objective against the interest of their group as a whole. Methods that affect the incentive systems range from supporting internal opposition to the war and cutting the arms supply to changing international trade agreements such as the case of the “blood diamonds”.

Action areas of peace-building include therefore methods and instruments from all three approaches: development aid to support political and economic reform and to rebuild infrastructure, fight against poverty, trust building and the establishment of relations between conflict protagonists, it is about empowerment of people or groups to solve conflicts in a non-violent way, supporting internal opposition to the war, cutting off the arms supply and influencing the terms of trade to make the global trade more fair and change international trade regimes in order to stop the trade with the “blood diamonds”. Peace-building is always long-term. It is not the same as building wells or equipping hospitals. Peace-building is a process.

OVERVIEW OF THE ROOT-CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT AND RELATED PROBLEM AREAS



Group work

Having looked at the root causes of conflict and the key problem areas associated, participants worked in groups to discuss conflicts in Nigeria and Zimbabwe.

(Group 1 - Nigeria)

Problem Area 1:

Indices of social inequalities are apparent without efficient public policy intervention to address them.

Problem Area 2:

Democratisation process in Nigeria is inclusive, broad based such that it reduces the possibility of an exclusive government's elites being controlled.

Problem Area 3:

Demographic pressure and exclusive exploitation of resources has brought intense competition among DFF groups resulting in DFF forms of conflicts.

Intervention

Liberalised economic policy opportunity, which will address vulnerable, groups as well as more inclusive social/political policies.

Group 2 - Study on Zimbabwe

Problem Area 1:

Political Society inequality

Problem Area 7:

Insufficient services

Problem Area 8:

Criminality

Problem Area 9:

Biased law

Problem Area 10:

Colonial legacy

Problem Area 11:

Absence pluralism

Problem Area 12:

Distrust

Intervention

The intervention should be to deal with the colonial legacy that is enshrined in the Lancashire Agreement which has led to political, social and economic imbalances exacerbated by lack of rule of law, and social marginalisation of groups along racial and ethnic lines. This is manifested in negative tension and violent outburst such as land grabbing, political supremacy of past grievances that undermines state capacity and legitimacy.

7. Network of African Peace Builders (NAPS)

January - June 2002

by

Rinos Simbulo

NAPS Co-ordinator

7.1 NAPS Report

Introduction

The Network of African Peace Builders (NAPS) is a continental multidisciplinary, independent network, which was established out of the greater demand for peace in the African Continent. At the turn of the century, violent conflicts have ravaged the continent with millions of people killed, maimed, and displaced. In 1994, the Austrian Study Peace Centre for Conflict Resolution (ASPR) through the support of the Austrian Government had begun a project of undertaking capacity building through the Peace building in Africa (PiA) project. It is from this project that NAPS was born. It was launched in Maputo, Mozambique in November 2001 and the Secretariat was established in Lusaka, Zambia.

Registration of NAPS

The network was formally and legally registered in Zambia on January 2, 2002, and issued with a certificate of registration number ORS/102/35/2453. Ten people signed the registration, which is the requirement according to the Zambian Law. Among the people that signed the registration were three members that took part in the training seminars in peace building conducted by ASPR. These are Mr Simbulo Rinos, Acting NAPS Co-ordinator, Mr Shakespeare Siatakwi and Mable Simwanda. Others were notable personalities from civil society organisations that were closely linked to issues of peace building, conflict prevention and human rights.

Activities

Since the registration in January, NAPS has undertaken some activities as outlined below.

1. Website Development

The website was developed and designed by the NAPS Co-ordinator in conjunction with the local Internet service provider, Zamnet Communications Systems Ltd. The site went on trial runs on the 27th February 2002. During the period, ASPR, and the Regional Co-ordinators were asked to make comments. Some useful comments came through from these stakeholders and changes were made to that effect. Development and improvement of the site is continuing. The website was financed by the ASPR, the NAPS Partner. The address of the website is www.naps.org.zm and the email address is naps@zamnet.zm.

2. Brochure Development

During the period under review the brochure was developed from the objectives and activities of the network. In addition to the brochure, a flier was also put together providing the historical summary of the network. This initiative was funded by ASPR.

3. Newsletter.

The Newsletter and its structure are currently in the final stages. The major content for the first issue of the newsletter will be summary articles of the presentations from the previous foundation and seminar courses. The NAPS Co-ordinator made a passionate appeal to Regional Co-ordinators to send in articles for the newsletter.

4. Planned Symposium

NAPS was asked to co-host an African symposium on Peace Building with Southern Africa Conflict Prevention Network (SACPN), should the decision of hosting the symposium be made for Zambia. Other organisations jointly working on the symposium are African Peace and Reconciliation Network, Coalition From Peace in Africa, Nairobi Peace Initiative, etc. Babu Ayindo, a lecturer at Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation is spearheading the initiative for the symposium.

Communication

Since establishment of the Secretariat, there has been no office equipment (computer, printer, telephone line, etc). During the quarter, the Secretariat has heavily depended on services rendered to it by various organisations. In the absence of such good will, communication depended on expensive paid up services through business centres. This has resulted in serious difficulties in dealing with certain matters in depth including the updating of the website due to cost constraints.

However, transfer of funds from ASPR for the purchase of computer and printer has been released. It is anticipated this ASPR grant would rescue the situation and improve the communication at the Secretariat.

Finances

The network has not received any funding from any other donor during the quarter except for funds that were transferred from ASPR for Website and Newsletter developments. The amount of US\$3 500 was transferred on February 2 to the NAPS account No.: 0 100 110207300, Standard Chartered Bank Zambia Plc.

Training

The quarter under review saw the beginning of the preparation for the foundation and specialisation seminars to be held in South Africa. The first write up regarding the dates for the two seminars was put on the website in March. The European University Centre for Peace (EUP) studies training brochure was also circulated to the Regional Co-ordinators for onward dissemination to potential applicants. The two training courses will see ASPR partnering NAPS and the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), an NGO based in Johannesburg.

Networking

During the quarter, networking meetings were held, among others, with SACPN, Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation and South Africa Centre for Conflict Resolution and Disputes (SACCORD). These are Zambian based organisations that have similar objectives to those of NAPS. These meetings proved useful in the area of information sharing.

Dr. Susanne Nebel's Visit to Zambia 13th - 15th February 2002

Dr Susanne Nebel, Programme Director ASPR, visited Zambia to familiarise herself with NAPS operations. During her visit, she held discussions with some former seminar participants of the past foundation and specialisation courses. She also met representatives from the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation (MEF), a training institution involved in peace building based in Zambia. Another meeting was conducted between NAPS and SACPN.

Research Project

Dr Nebel informed the meeting about ASPR's 20th Anniversary celebration in September 2002. As part of the celebration, NAPS was invited to participate in a research based on a north-south dialogue. She emphasised the need for NAPS to take part in the research project. It was resolved that the letter from the President of ASPR on the research be circulated to all Regional Co-ordinators and other possible researchers within NAPS. The Regional Co-ordinators should identify researchers who would do abstract papers.

Handbook

The issue of a handbook production was discussed. Dr Nebel reported that Alain from Zimbabwe, who had earlier indicated that his organisation would take up the design and production of the handbook, was now unable to undertake the project. This meant that either a new partner had to be identified or a specific project proposal be written for funding. The question of going into partnership with SACPN was discussed. SACPN has also on their agenda the production of a handbook, although their approach only focused on the Southern African region.

Networking

The issue of networking was emphasised during the meeting. NAPS was tasked to contact all regional networks using the Regional Co-ordinators. This contact should lead to practical interaction and collaboration between NAPS and the Regional networks. Regular contact between and among Regional Co-ordinators was also emphasised. Each communication that is between Regional Co-ordinators should be copied to the NAPS Co-ordinator and ASPR. This will assist to evaluate and document such initiatives. This constitutes the backbone of networking.

Foundation and Specialisation Courses

Dr Nebel briefed the NAPS Co-ordinator on her visit to South Africa in relation to the inspection of the venue. Two venues in Pretoria were short listed pending confirmation. The venues are Zebra Country Lodge and Rhodeei Valley Lodge. The final venue will be communicated to all would be participants. The possible dates for the specialisation were 7-14 July 2002.

Dr Nebel also presented her briefing on her visit to the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSV) in South Africa. The Centre was willing to co-operate with NAPS although modalities would need to be worked out. Tracy Viennings was helpful in creating the linkage between CSV and NAPS. Susanne implored the need for further co-operation and practical projects that could be implemented jointly by the two organisations.

Conclusion

After presentation of the report by the NAPS Co-ordinator, a SWOT analysis was undertaken in plenary session.

7.2 SWOT Analysis

Strengths

- Network brings together different/many/multidisciplinary organisations;
- It is present in all the four geographical African regions and can share experiences;
- Have a constitution and clear objectives and structures on the ground;
- It brings together civil society, government and the private sector;
- Supported by a reputable organisation (ASPR), which provides a firm base to build from;
- Members have common background, having attended the foundation and specialisation courses;
- Capable human resource;
- Good resource persons/facilitators during courses;
- Enabling environment - a "niche" needed in the Continent;
- Lucky to have Rinos Simbulo (Network Co-ordinator) available.

Weaknesses

- Inadequate financial resources;
- Inadequate communication between all levels and all regions;
- Inadequate of communication between Co-ordinators and members;
- Inadequate commitment;
- Inadequate experience and skills by the network;
- Inadequate motivation (what do we get from the network?);
- Inadequate of structured relationship with other networks;
- Not enough work done in the regions so far;
- No impact as yet on the peace on the continent?
- Inadequate of continental recognition and how do we improve on activities?

Threats

- Co-ordinators using own resources;
- Very hard to evaluate the impact of the network;
- Over reliance on donor funding;
- Heterogeneity could be a threat;
- Members always think some one else in the network will do the work;
- Government officials may fail to incorporate NAPS work in their daily activities;
- Some members do not have space in their work time. What contribution should be structured for such members?
- Clearly identify what needs to be done, how and by who (close gaps).
- Copyright and original work giving acknowledgement.

Opportunities

- Peace-building is a current issue in the continent;
- The courses and forums allow members to meet;
- Members can use their personal contacts to promote NAPS;
- Members can make a difference on the continent;
- Network gives members access to many different organisations and structures;
- The large membership gives us strength to approach institutions and structures;
- Many people within the network have varied expertise, skills, education and backgrounds (multi-disciplinary);
- Harness and co-ordinate peace building resources;
- Make facilitators as active members of the network.

After going through the SWOT analysis, participants were divided into groups for discussions with a view to strengthen the network.

Group Work

Question 1: We have identified a number of opportunities. How can we capitalise on our opportunities and turn them into concrete actions?

- Come up with a proposal for concrete intervention programs in communities in conflicts, e.g., ethnical and political;
- Develop an action plan based on information sharing from such meetings and forums;
- Since members belong to different organisations, from different countries and interact with different organisations, there is need to sell NAPS to various people, organisations and countries;
- Utilise the available human resource in the network as a form of capacity expansion as a cost-saving measure;
- As NAPS membership grows, this will result in a strong/loud voice ideal for recognition, advocacy and lobbying.

Question 2: How can communication be improved among:

(a) Co-ordinators?

- The Acting Co-ordinator to communicate with the regional co-ordinators through email, fax, telephone, surface mail, etc.
- Meetings of Co-ordinators in a particular region to be held at least once a year.

(b) Co-ordinators and members?

- E-mail, fax, telephone, surface mail.
- Meetings to be held, at least once a year;
- Co-ordinators should identify in each country someone reliable to work with.

(c) Co-ordinators and other networks, organisations and institutions?

- When there is a NAPS activity, other networks should be invited.
- Create structural linkages with other networks and institutions, share responsibilities and undertake joint projects.

Question 4: Define roles of Co-ordinators in improving communication.

The following qualities of Co-ordinators should also be seen if communication could improve;

- Commitment
- Goodwill
- Practical work in peace building
- Activist in peace building

Role of Acting Co-ordinator in Improving Communication

- Identify one reliable person in each country where NAPS has members and communicate with him/her directly to strengthen the network.

Question 5. Identify processes or systems that will motivate members to remain active in NAPS (include in your answers, what do I want from the network?) If some do not have space at work- how best can they contribute?

Motivation

Regional initiatives - create activities within regions by having:

- Comments on regional/national peace issues (newspapers and newsletters);
- Collective publications.

Follow up on contacts (personal), nationally and regionally:

- Database creation should be at the forefront;
- Tapping into available NAPS members;
- Contacts with regional and other organisations
- Channel personal/regional/individual members' contribution through regional co-ordinators to the Secretariat.

Space at Work

- Members can contribute by providing public relations, making contacts, and undertake research to market the network.
- Members must have the goodwill.

**Specialisation Course, "Peace-building and Development"
Zebra Country Lodge, Republic of South Africa
1 – 6 July, 2002**

Sunday, 30 June

	Arrival	
19.00	Welcome dinner	

Monday, 1 July

9.00 - 10.30	Official opening of the Program Introduction of Participants Introduction of Program	Susanne Nebel, ASPR Program Director; Rinos Simbulo, Acting NAPS Co-ordinator; Tracy Vienings, Acting Director, CSVV
10.30 – 11.00	Break	
11.00 – 12.30	Peace-building and Development Conceptual Framework	Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Africa's International Relations, Lecturer Wits University
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	
14.00 – 15.30	Structural Stability (Political Structures, Participatory Democracy, Legitimate and Restorative Justice System, Peace and Security System	Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Africa's International Relations, Lecturer Wits University
15.30 – 16.00	Tea Break	
16.00 – 17.00	Working Groups	
19.00	Informal Dinner Session	With Babu Ayindo, Training Director, Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation

Tuesday, 2 July

09.00 - 10.30	Structural Stability (Social and Environmental Conditions, Human Rights, IEC	Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Africa's International Relations, Lecturer Wits University
10.30 – 11.00	Break	
11.00 – 12.30	New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD)	Christopher Landsberg, Director, Centre for Africa's International Relations, Lecturer Wits University
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	
14.00 – 15.30	Peace-building and Development The International Donor Community	Michael Lake, EC Head of Delegation Caroline Gudenus, Counsellor, Austrian Embassy
15.30 – 16.00	Break	
16.00 – 17.00	Working Groups	
19.00	Dinner	

Wednesday, 3 July

09.00 - 10.30	Network Workshop Co-ordinator Meeting	Susanne Nebel, ASPR Program Director; Rinos Simbulo, Acting NAPS Co- ordinator;
10.30 – 11.00	Break	
11.00 – 12.30	Network Action Planning	Susanne Nebel, ASPR Program Director; Rinos Simbulo, Acting NAPS Co- ordinator;
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	
14.00 – 15.30	Network Action Planning cont.	Susanne Nebel, ASPR Program Director; Rinos Simbulo, Acting NAPS Co- ordinator;
15.30 – 16.00	Break	
16.00 – 17.00	Network Action Planning cont.	Susanne Nebel, ASPR Program Director; Rinos Simbulo, Acting NAPS Co- ordinator;
19.00	Dinner with Social Event	

Thursday, 4 July

09.00 - 10.30	Peace Enhancing Structures Sustainable Economic Development	Abdun Noor, Operations Management and Learning Specialist, World Bank
10.30 – 11.00	Break	
11.00 – 12.30	The Globalisation of the Economy and National Development Efforts	Abdun Noor, Operations Management and Learning Specialist, World Bank
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	
14.00 – 16.00	Privatising Peace The new corporate social responsibilities The public, private, civil society partnerships	Abdun Noor, Operations Management and Learning Specialist, World Bank; Abdel Fatau Musah, Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), Senegal;
15.30 – 16.00	Break	
16.00 – 17.00	Group Discussion	
19.00	Dinner	

Friday, 5 July

09.00 - 10.30	Development and Conflict: Nature and Causes of Conflict Impact of Development on Conflicts	Abdel Fatau Musah, Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), Senegal; Susanne Nebel; ASPR Program Director;
10.30 – 11.00	Break	
11.00 – 12.30	Conflict Sensitive Development Case Studies	Abdel Fatau Musah, Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), Senegal; Susanne Nebel; ASPR Program Director;
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	
14.00 – 15.30	Designing and Managing Projects for Sustainable Development	Abdun Noor, Operations Management and Learning Specialist, World Bank
15.30 – 16.00	Break	
16.00 – 17.00	Working Groups	
19.00	Dinner	

Saturday, 6 July

9.00 - 10.30	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)	Susanne Nebel; ASPR Program Director
10.30 – 11.00	Break	
11.00 – 12.30	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) cont.	Susanne Nebel; ASPR Program Director
12.30 – 14.00	Lunch Break	
14.00 – 15.30	Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) cont.	Susanne Nebel; ASPR Program Director
15.30 – 16.00	Break	
16.00 – 17.00	Conclusions Evaluations	Christopher Landsberg; Abdun Noor; Abdel Fatau Musah; Tracy Vienings; Susanne Nebel
19.00	Dinner	

Sunday, 7 July

	Departure	
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Annex II: List of Lecturers

Lecturers, List of Address, Specialisation Course, July 1 - 6, 2002, RSA									
	Family name	First name	Organisation	Address	City	Country	Telephone	Fax	E-mail
Dr. Abdel Fatau	Musah	Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA)	BP 008, Immeuble EPI, Boulevard du Sud X Rue des Ecrivains	Dakar - Fann	Senegal	++221 869 1024	++221 824 0942	amusah@osiwa.org	
Dr. Noor	Abdun	Center for Managing Implementation of Development Projects	11712 Lake Potomac Drive, MD 20854	Potomac	USA	001 301 983 3893	001 301 983 3893	anoor@worldbank.org	

Mr. Landsberg	Chris	Department of International Relations, University of the Witwatersrand	Private Bag 3, 2050	WITS	South Africa	++27 11 716-2921 or ++27 11 7174382	++27 11 339 4605	161 chris@cosmos.wits.ac.za
Mr. Simbululo	Rinos	Network of African Peace Builders (NAPS)	P.O Box 39121	Lusaka	Zambia	00260-1-232686	00260-1-232686	rsimbululo@yahoo.co.uk naps@zamnet.zm
Dr. Nebel	Susanne	Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR)	Rochusplatz 1 Burg A-7461 Stadtschlaining	Vienna	Austria	0043 3355-2498	0043 3355-2662	nebel@aspr.ac.at

Ms. Vienings	Tracy	Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVr)	POB. 30778, Braamfontein 2017	Johannesburg	South Africa	271140356500027 11 3396785	trienings@csvr.org.za
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Annex III: List of Participants

Participants, List of Address, Specialisation Course, July 1 - 6, 2002, RSA								
Family name	First name	Organisation	Address	City	Country	telephone	Fax	E-mail
Ms. Adebayo	Modupe	Campaign Against Environment Degradation (CAAGED)	POB. 12249	Ikeja, Lagos	Nigeria	++234 1 4963598	++234 1 4963598	dupe.adebayo@mailcity.com
Mr. Agev	Demenongu	NAPS West Africa Region	P.O. Box 7632, Muse, Abuja	Muse, Abuja	Nigeria	00234-9-413-2365	00234-9-4132365	napswa@yahoo.co.uk agevdm@hotmail.com; agevdm@yahoo.co.uk
Mr. Bagamba	B. Chris	Civil - Affairs Dept, UPDF- GHQS	P.O. Box 11219	Kampala	Uganda	00256 77404648	00256 41343668	00256 41349462 chrisbagamba@yahoo.co.uk

Mr. Bisetsa	Jean-Chrys		P O Box 1760	Bujumbura	Burundi	00257-217657 or 00257 921024	00257-22- 8480	hapsca@yahoo.fr cbisetsa@hotmail.com
Mr. Cacumba Morais Faria	Simao	Forum Of Angolan NGOs (FONGA)	Rua D Manuel I No. 35. Apart F PO Box 10797	Maculusso, Luanda	Angola	00244 2 320407	00244 2 322637	fonga@angonet.org
Ms. Cherinda	Lúcia	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Co-operation, Europe and America Directory	Second Floor Flat 21	Maputo	Mozambique	+258 82 480218 (mobile)	258 1 491960	luciacherinda@hotmail.com
Mr. Chicuecue	Noel	UNESCO Office - Maputo	Ave. Fredrik Engels Nr. 515, CP 1397	Maputo	Mozambique	00258-1-493434	00258-1- 493431	n.chicuecue@unesco.org

Ms. Clarke Kamuhuza	Yaliwe	Southern Africa Conflict Prevention Network (SACP/N)	olo Kepe Zambia 195-171 Road Road, Kabulonga, P.O. Box 36524	Lusaka	Zambia	00260 1 261 119 00260-1-261 124	00260-1-261 126	masozimalik@yahoo.com Yaliwe@kepa.org.zm
Mr. Elsadiq Mustafa	Osman	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Peace and Humanitarian Affairs	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Khartoum Sudan	Khartoum	Sudan	00249 12 243845 00249 11 783535	2.49E+10	almagly@hotmail.com
Mr. Fombad	Charles	Department of Law, University of Botswana	Private Bag UB 00705	Gaborone	Botswana	00 267 303389	00267 31 585099	FOMBADCC@mopipi.ub.bw
Mr. Kasule	Abdul	Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs	POB 40297	Kampala	Uganda	00256 41 343401	00256 41 341142	Kasulab@yahoo.com

Ms. Manga Bessem	Elizabeth	Division of Legal Affairs and Treaties Ministry of External Relations Yaounde	POB. 3683	Messa - Yaounde	Cameroon	00 237 7739648	00237 2210334	bessmanga@yahoo.com
Mr. Musona	Mambo Ignatius	Silveira House	Box 545	Harare	Zimbabwe	++263 4 491066/7	++263 4 491857	admin@silveira.co.zw research@silveira.co.zw
Dr. Oshita	Osang	Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution, the Presidency	Constitution Avenue, P.M.B. 349	Garki	Abuja Nigeria	00234 9 6701319	++243 9 4136849	okibe2000@yahoo.com
Mr. Picardo	Juliano Victoria	Technical Unit of Formation of Presidential Office (UTEF)	Av. Amed Sekou Toure 657	Maputo	Mozambique	00258 82-486246	00258-1-304999	childnet@zebra.uem.mz

Ms. Sabiti	Stella	Center for Conflict Resolution (CECORE)	POB 521 1	Kampala	Uganda	256 77 551 633 +256 41 25505533 234405	00256 41 251 922/ 255033	cecocre@africaonline.co.ug; cecocre@swiftuganda.com; ssabiti@hotmail.com www.cecocre.org
Ms. Simwanda	Mable	Permanent Human Rights Commission	Independence Av., POB. 33812	Lusaka	Zambia	002601251327 002601251357 0026096459052	00260 1 251 342	phrc@zamnet.zm



Evaluation

Seminar

on

Peace-building and Development


July 1 - July 6, 2002

Zebra Country Lodge / Republic of South Africa

1. EVALUATION OF THE PROGRAM


1.1 Usefulness for my professional development

Excellent	6
Good	10
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0




1.1 Usefulness for my personal development

Excellent	9
Good	5
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	2




1.2 Content

Excellent	9
Good	8
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0



1.4 Methodology of the programme


Excellent	4
Good	12
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0



1.5 Organisation of the program


Daily time schedule

Excellent	4
Good	10
Fair	2
Poor	0
No Answer	1



Staff of organisers

Excellent	10
Good	6
Fair	1
Poor	0
No Answer	0



Hotel facilities

Excellent	13
Good	4
Fair	0
Poor	0
No Answer	0

